By Dr Kinfe Abraham
CHAPTER 1 THE BASIS AND CONTESTABILITY OF ACCORDS
A B S T R A C T
CURRENT AND HISTORICAL HURDLES TO AN AGREEMENT
CHAPTER 2 THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICS
ON PSYCHO-POLITICS: EGYPT’S ANXIETY OVER WATER SECURITY
CHAPTER 3 THE PSYCHO-POLITICAL HURDLE OF PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER 4 REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ROADBLOCKS TO AN ACCORD
THE ALLIANCES AND LINK OF EGYPT WITH THE WEST
THE SUDAN FACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EASTERNIZATION OF THE NILE
CHAPTER 5 THE RED SEA FACTOR IN THE NILE ISSUE
CHAPTER 6 IMPACT OF HYDRO-POLITICS ON PSYCHO-POLITICS
CHAPTER 7 NEW PROPOSALS AND MODALITIES FOR A NILE ACCORD
CHAPTER 8 AGREEMENT AS A WAY OF REMOVING OR MINIMIZING CONFLICT
HYDROPOLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
A MENU OF OPTIONS OF SOLUTIONS
CHAPTER 9 THE WAY FORWARD TO BREAK THE PSYCHO-POLITICAL IMPASSE
CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION
WHY THIRD PARTIES SHOULD PUSH FOR AGREEMENTS
GLOBAL IMPERATIVES FOR AN AGREEMENT
THE RATIONALE OF WATER DEFICIENCY AS AN ARGUMENT FOR AN AGREEMENT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SELECTED BIBLOGRAPHY
CHAPTER ONE: THE BASIS AND CONTESTABILITY OF ACCORDS
Water, says Islamic law, is a source of life. It is not oil: countries may fight over oil, nobody gets emotional about the stuff. Water arouses intense, passionate emotions.
Islamic law
The Economist1
A new Nile Waters Agreement should address six major issues ... In essence, the new agreement would focus on opportunities for expanding the usable yield of the Blue Nile river basin and encourage interdependencies among these basin countries. Allocations of water rights would include provisions for apportionment in times of scarcity and
establish, at least in principle, guidelines for a regional water market in the upper basin.
Winttingate, Dale (et.al)2
A B S T R A C T
The complexity of the problem of the equitable sharing and utilization of the water of the Nile is underscored by the nature of past agreements such as the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water Agreements signed between Egypt and the Sudan in which both countries agreed to allocate the net historical yield of 74 BCM at the Aswan Dam between themselves on the basis of 55.5 BCM for Egypt and 18.5 for the Sudan. Ethiopia was excluded from these negotiations and none of the total available water was made available to it
The seriousness of this issue is also underpinned by many factors including the following:
1. The legal contestability of the bilateral accords on a third party which has great vested interests in the issue.
2. Ethiopia's disadvantaged position as the source of Nile and a crucial contributor of 85% of the water and the
rich soil which it carries with it.
3. The demographic alarm which is ticking to remind Ethiopia to look into the future. This concern derives from
two factors: by the year 2025 the population of Ethiopia is projected to reach 122 million, this will be 20% higher
than that of Egypt.
4. The enigmatic question deriving from the above is and will be: Can Ethiopia morally and politically afford to let
its population starve for fear of the cost of conflicts with other riparians? This has to be carefully weighted against
the socio-moral and political costs of a domestic starving population vis-à-vis the costs of a Nile-induced conflict,
whose victors, if any, are hard to predict.
5. Three other equally disquieting issues relate to:
a) the implication of a rapidly degenerating ecosystem;
b) the effect of ecological degradation taking place in the Ethiopian highlands in the long-term which will raise Ethiopia’s water requirement; and
c) the effect of the reduced volume of water which will flow to the lower riparian countries like Egypt whose needs are also bound to rise because of demographic pressure.
6. A sixth factor which underlines the urgency of finding a lasting solution is that bad preparation is better than no
preparation and a prolonged impasse is unaffordable to all riparians including the current beneficiaries. Needless
to say, the situation will be exacerbated by the mismatch between supply and demand of water.
7. The urgency of finding a workable modus vivendi is also underpinned by the gap between the historical
assertion of Egypt and Ethiopia's demand of justice and equity.
8. Given the above pressure and the somewhat pessimistic projections on the volume of the water of the Nile,
most Nile countries cannot afford to live with edict of history. For Egypt the attempt to maintain the status quo on
the argument of historical rights will be untenable morally, ethically and even politically. For it would be
tantamount to depriving others of life while caring for ones own.
9. The predicament of other riparians is the same. It applies to Sudan which, after all, sees itself as a junior
beneficiary. For Ethiopia the obvious question is and will for a long time be: Why should the country which provides
85% of the water of the Blue Nile be deprived of its fair share? Even those countries which have heretofore
endorsed the argument of historical rights which have leverage over banks and other financial institutions will
finally vote for justice.
Against this backdrop, it is imperative to consider current hurdles to an agreement and explore the modalities and means for removing them by shedding all inhibitions and anxieties. For in the end, no matter how complex and enigmatic the issue is, it has to be faced squarely and with the open minds of all.
Naturally, the above would call for removing the psycho-political causes of distrust and in difference. Given such positive efforts, the Nile offers a great potential for friendship and co-operation. But the opportunity must be seized in time and with the right spirit. A right start must begin with the affirmation of the maxim “What is good for the goose is also good for gander."3
CURRENT AND HISTORICAL HURDLES TO AN AGREEMENT
KEY ISSUES
The hurdles for a negotiated solution at present revolve around:
1. the mood of distrust and suspicion surrounding the whole issue of the Nile;
2. the historical inability of Ethiopia and Sudan to make credible commitments to Egypt due to past domestic constraints;
3. Sudan’s current domestic conflict which deprives it of a competitive edge in negotiations;
4. Egypt’s reluctance to make compromises without the assurance that the concession it makes today are worth the domestic political price of tomorrow. This in turn prevents it from halting its desert reclamation program;
5. capitalizing on military clout by some riparians;
6. the absence of qualified hydrological experts in the upstream countries with knowledge of details on the Nile and effective negotiation kits;
7. lack of databases on the above and fear of being outmaneuvered by the Egyptian team of negotiators which include high caliber and knowledgeable engineers and diplomats;
8. lack of dialogue among all riparian countries;
9. the adverse effect of propaganda on the mood of negotiations;
10. the conflict of interest stemming from other sub-regional issues and interests;
11. the mystification of the Nile which in large measure has made open deliberations on it a taboo;
12. past personal politics which gave precedence to other issues and deprived the Nile of the attention it deserved;
13. regional politics such as the establishment of the OAU which shifted attention from the Nile to the preoccupation of the continental organization and Pan-Africanism;
14. the Arab-Israeli conflict which skewed Ethiopia's alliance in favor of Israel and the OAU resolution of 1973 which made Ethiopia take a pro-Egyptian position despite its strong historical links with Israel which would have demanded neutrality;
15. change of political systems and governments in Ethiopia which shifted focus to ideological consideration as in the era of the Derg in Ethiopia;
16. changes in the ideological alliances of Egypt as embodied in Nasser's pro-socialist proclivity of the mid-1950s and Sadat's pro-western tack of the late 1970s;
17. the consistency of the Egyptian position on the Nile partly because of the unperturbed political lineage of leadership in Egypt and partly because of lack of assertion by other riparians;
18. the historical weight of bi-polarism which made the superpowers favor one country as against the other without due regard to the real issue of the Nile at stake;
19. the lack of past attention to issues like the environment and transboundary resources; and
20. the recent shift of opinion on these issues due to globalization and the desire to form economic blocs of in the Middle East.
To the above may also be added historical and cultural factors including religious ties which had linked Egypt and Ethiopia. One such factor was the center of the Eastern Orthodox Church was in Egypt, and the Ethiopian bishops who appointed Ethiopian monarchs came from Egypt. This gave Egypt some influence in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.
One example of Egyptian interference in Ethiopian internal affairs was that it (Egypt) refused to send its bishops when Yukuno Amlak after accession to the throne in 1270 subdued the Moslem dominated sultanate of Yifat adjacent to Showa. In fact, it was not until Emperor Yukuno Amlak conducted a successful campaign against all sultanates allied to Cairo that Egypt was again forced to send the bishops. In addition to his military victories Amdetsion had in fact threatened Al Nasir that he would divert the course of the Nile. It was then that Al-Umari said “Ethiopia is the guardian of the course of the Nile."
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CHAPTER TWO
THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICS ON PSYCHO-POLITICS: EGYPT’S ANXIETY OVER WATER SECURITY
SOME HISTORICAL REASONS FOR A DELAYED AGREEMENT ON THE NILE
The anxiety over the use of the water of the Nile is not simply a consequence of its impact as a key element in the life support system of Egypt’s physical survival, but it is also intimately linked with the role of the Nile as a symbol of national security and national cohesion.
Above all, as Egyptian Ambassador Marwan Bedr at a lecture at the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development in Addis Ababa in 1999 observed, the Nile is also an issue of national obsession for Egyptians both individually and collectively. This naturally heightens the general anxiety about conflicts. This is not, however, to say that anxiety or emotion about the Nile (not a conflict) is necessarily negative for Egypt. On the contrary, it has historically been positive because the Nile has been a magical rallying point for all Egyptians.
The role of the Nile as the monumental symbol which every Egyptian grasps and understands is due to its virile presence in Egyptian life. But, it is also underscored by legend, myth and history. The historical factor in the Egyptian psyche in particular is bound to endure regardless of whether a rational rapprochement on the equitable utilization of the water of the Nile is reached or not.
It is also instructive to note how the significance of the construction of the Aswan Dam was viewed in the early 1950s. The crucial concern was that President G. Nasser needed a spectacular and visible symbol both for the new Egypt and for the establishment of Egyptian primacy in the Middle East. He thus adopted the concept of ‘water security’ from his enemies, the British who said ‘No one can hold Egypt securely unless he also holds the whole valley of the Nile. If the sources of the river is in hostile or even indifferent hands it must always be a grave cause of danger’ (Peel 1904:112) ‘Thus, the Aswan High Dam was built to free Egypt from being the historic hostage of upstream riparian states’ (Pompe, quoted in Salel Badour 1960:213; Collins 1990b:163).
For Egypt, using the water security argument had several important facets. For one thing, it projected a visible external enemy which threatened the Egyptian national security, which in turn cemented the alliance of Egyptians for a common crusade. The second consequence was Egypt’s viability and survival as a country, which is almost wholly dependent on the Nile.
Water security had, therefore, the purpose of providing freedom from foreign control over Egyptian waters and that of providing security during periods of water shortages. The Aswan High Dam’s first and most important purpose was, thus, to provide long-term storage of water within the boundaries of Egypt. The idea was that, over years, storage would protect Egypt from the fluctuations of the Nile floods.4
Clearly, and, to an extent, understandably Egypt did not have any compunctions about the necessity of protecting its interest over the Nile regardless of the associated costs such as a loss of goodwill among the countries like Ethiopia and other less significant riparians to whom it should at least be obliged.
Historically, while it lasted, the argument of ‘Water Security’ which President Nasser adeptly used was a strong argument for the Egyptians against the British and the riparians which share the Nile in common. The latter did not regard it as tenable in the long-term, but Nasser was again to exploit it adroitly in the emerging East-West geo-political rivalry. Here, the manner in which the USSR was drawn into the Aswan project is revealing:
On the global scale, the most dramatic influence affecting the construction of the Aswan High Dam was the Egyptian shift from its political alliance with the West to the Soviet Union. In 1956 the USA, Great Britain and the World Bank withdrew their offers to Egypt to construct the High Dam because of Egyptian policy towards neutrality and its alignment with the USSR. Subsequently, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in order to finance the construction of the High Dam with profits from the Canal. The consequent Anglo-French-Israeli war against Egypt (1956) made the Egyptians even more insistent on realizing the project. The Soviet Union stepped in and offered its technical and financial assistance in the construction of the dam. The Aswan Dam represented a very prestigious project for the USSR which was anxious to show its superior technology in this show case project. Success meant gaining more geo-political clout in the Middle East at large.5
Egypt’s Middle Eastern clout was clearly a plus not only for its role in the Arab world but also in large parts of Africa. Ethiopia which was pro-western at the time had no choice but to thread a cautious and slow path. Its western allies were not any more ready or interested to get embroiled in a squabble over the Nile. Many of them had other more pressing geo-political interest to attend to elsewhere.
Egypt was also assisted by the nascent mood of Arab nationalism which galvanized the Arab world behind it over the Palestinian cause. This received further boost after the liberation euphoria of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism in which Ethiopia along with Ghana, Egypt and a few of the first group of independent African states tried to play a vanguard role. Again, this made the issue of the Nile a less probable item of discussion on the agenda of Ethio-Egyptian bilateral diplomacy. The agenda of the day was set by the optimism of victory over colonialism and nascent imperialism which were seen as detrimental both to Arab, African cohesion, together or separately, and to the personal politics of the emergent leaders.
Personal politics carried a lot of weight in the psycho-politics of the period. Nasser was close to Haile Selassie. Sentiments weighed above substance. While this lasted, the Nile could no longer be a pressing agenda. Meantime Ethio-Egyptian friendship swung from between warm, luke-warm and cold.
A discussion on the Nile was also delayed by Ethiopia’s decision to support the OAU resolution which backed Egypt. This kept Ethio-Egyptian relations pitched at the same optimistic level for some more years. Nevertheless, there is no hiding the fact that Ethiopia was excluded from the bilateral agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia was indeed unhappy about the construction of the dams such as the ones located in the Sudan, namely, the Sennar, Kashm El Eirba, Jebel Aulia and Roseires.
Jebel Aulia which was intended to store water for Egypt which is totally useless with a storage of nil, was particularly unnerving. It is now widely believed that through its removal it is possible to save about 1.5 bn m3 of water. (Waterbury 1979:93)
Yet, historically the entitlement or legitimacy for using the water of the Nile is underscored by the Helsinki rules (Article V/K). It calls for the satisfaction of the needs of one co-basin country without causing significant harm to the other, as adopted as part of the Helsiaki understanding (U.N.1970:78). This is further dwelt on in the concluding section on the reallocation of the water of the Nile.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PSYCHO-POLITICAL HURDLE OF PROPAGANDA
THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF PROPAGANDA ON THE CLIMATE OF NEGOTIATIONS
Several factors have contributed to the delayed negotiations on the Nile. For instance, the adverse effect of negative propaganda on the psycho-political mood for negotiations was significant. Nevertheless, considerable improvement have been made during the Mubarak presidency, compared with the period before it.
Earlier the adverse polemics of Egyptian leaders had become roadblock to negotiations. Some of the Egyptian leaders had, in fact, tried to flex their military muscle to prevent Ethiopia from engaging in development work on the Nile. For instance, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat is quoted as having said, “Egypt would never permit Ethiopia to exploit the waters of the Blue Nile"6 and concluded by appealing to Arab countries to shoulder their historical responsibilities.
In the above coded message which lends itself to different interpretations, Sadat may have intended to convey at least two key messages. One is to appeal to the Arab States to emulate the example of Egyptian support to the Palestinians. His second message may have been intended to appeal to Arab countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other, to follow Egypt’s example and support the Eritrean insurrection in order to destabilize Ethiopia. Similar propaganda was paraded through the national news and print media and external broadcasts which had listeners and readers in the Arabic world as target groups.
At times, similar propaganda had also found outlets in English newspapers and magazines. One very recent example of this is the coverage on Ethio-Egyptian relation carried in the paper Al Hayat published on August 16, 1996 in Lodon.7
Any one who reads the article published in Al Hayat will not find it difficult to form some opinion on its content. The general impression one gets is that the article has an official blessing, and that it is intended to elicit official Ethiopian reaction. Further, its time of release suggests that it was clearly intended to drum up Arab League support for the Egyptian views on the Nile.
Coming as it did at a time when the Arab world was at a loss about which strategy to adopt on the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian negotiations which following the victory of the Likud Party of Prime Minister Benjamin Natenyahu, it was intended to have a better attention in the Arab world.
The Nile also generally seems to have had an upper hand in other contexts. For instance, the above reaction came at a time when Ethiopia and Egypt were collaborating over sanctions to be applied on the Sudan. But all things taken into account, it is by no means surprising that propaganda has generally had an adverse effect on the mood for negotiations.
The above was, for instance, true of the case of the assassination attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak which the Ethiopian security officers brilliantly foiled. The immediate reaction of sources close to Government circles was that the rescue operation was the work of Mr. Mubarak’s body guards. It thus took the strong reaction of the Ethiopian Government for the Egyptians to concede the truth most reluctantly and agree on strategies of hunting down the terrorists. Such propaganda is not likely to strengthen the goodwill for negotiations. Another example is Egypt’s change of heart on the comprehensive economic and military sanctions proposed to be applied on Sudan which flew in the face of the UN resolution tabled by Ethiopia.
Propaganda has also played a negative role on the chances of improvement of the climate of cooperation on the Nile which could have led to some form of modus vivendi. One reason for such reaction is that Egypt is unduly anxious about potential action by the Nile countries including Ethiopia. Such reaction surfaces even when the most minimalist suggestion of using a fraction of the water of the Nile which will not have any bearing on the total flow of water to Egypt is raised.
At times, such propaganda might be prompted by fear of the historical links between Ethiopia and Israel. An attempt to give the Nile issue a Zionist garb, for instance, surfaces in the Al Hayat article published at the time of acrimony in the Arab world. Mention is even made of a deal between Israel and Ethiopia.
The Egyptian Government is fully cognizant of the fact that a deal between Ethiopia and Israel is non-existent. In fact, contrary to the suggestion of Al Hayat, some Middle Eastern analysts suggest that the idea of building a canal to transport the water of the Nile to the Gaza Strip was taken up during deliberation at the Camp-David Accord of 1978 and 1979.
Naturally, propaganda that rouses emotions of national fervour and territorial sovereignty is likely to invite a similar reaction. Hence, Ethiopia’s response was one of accusing Egypt of expansionist ambitions; and of "creating the so-called Eritrean Liberation Front, of training and arming the terrorists assembled in that organization to help Cairo achieve its designs, at Ethiopia’s expense, of realizing its dream of controlling the sources of the Nile; and of beating cold war drums to use first the Soviet Union and then the United States for the realization of its sinister agenda." It was also noted that in the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt was an ally of the USSR, when the name of the game was fighting “Zionism and Western Imperialism."8
Unfortunately the hysteria of the Egyptian leaders was not deterred by change of ideology or ideological alignment. It, thus, took long for the Egyptian leadership to switch from the so-called anti-imperialist polemics to a pro-west one.
When Sadat, who served as Nasser’s deputy, came to power, “Egypt’s policy changed 360 degrees and yesterday’s anti-imperialists’ became champions of western ‘democracy’ and free enterprise. In both cases cold war drums were beaten but the drums cleverly concealed one essential truth¾preventing Ethiopia from building dams on the Blue Nile River."9
However, despite the de-stabilizing effect of the Eritrean conflict, the first phase of Ethiopia’s $300 million Tana Beles Project began in 1988. The project was aimed at doubling Ethiopia’s hydroelectric power and to provide irrigation for a settlement scheme that would take water from Lake Tana to the Beles River across which five dams were to be built. Some 200,000 farmers were also to be settled after the completion of this project.10
However, Egypt blocked a loan from the African Development Bank because Cairo feared that the Tana Beles project could harm Egypt.
Thus, propaganda also had sometimes taken the character of falsification or distortion of facts. For instance, when Water Resources Minister Abdul Hadi Radi informed a stormy parliamentary session in Cairo that the drought was due to meager rainfall in Ethiopia and not due to the diversion of the waters of the river Nile, he was not telling the whole truth.11
Indeed, the long drought in Ethiopia had lowered the water in the Aswan High Dam’s Lake Nasser to levels that threatened the complete stoppage of the turbines. While moving to impede Ethiopia’s expanded use of Blue Nile waters, he should have also mentioned that Egypt had began an expanded use of its own.12
It must also be noted that digging had begun for the Salam (peace) Canal¾at a cost of $1.4 billion. The project was aimed to carry 12.5 million cubic meters a day of fresh water from the Nile into the Northern Sinai, by traversing the Red Sea and the Suez Canal in order to irrigate 400,000 acres of new farmland.13
The canal is aimed to open the way for three million or more Egyptians to eventually populate a region that is now home to only some 250,000. This is the second largest public works project in Egypt’s history; second only to the Aswan High Dam. The massive project entails constructing a canal from Lake Nasser to carry water for a distance of 1856 miles to the north west. The project could cost as much as $90 billion; by 2000 it is supposed to bring under cultivation 500,000 acres of land around the Bars Oasis. “We must expand beyond the narrow valley we have lived in for centuries. Our population is now 60 million and there are only 8 million acres of agricultural land," says Hosni Mubarak. Egyptian scientists like Farous Elba oppose the project on the ground that the waters of the Nile are not inexhaustible. Tony Allen of the University of London calls the plan a “national fantasy."14
It is also suggested that the issue of the canal was taken up during the Egyptian-Israeli discussion over prospects of economic co-operation in the Middle-East in 1993. In fact, some sources allege that Mr. Arafat had pointedly suggested that the reaction of Ethiopia Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on the idea of building the said canal to pump water from the Nile to Gaza Strip be solicited.
This background partly explains the strong desire of the Egyptian Government to prevent Ethiopia from utilizing the Nile waters clearly mirrored in Al Hayat. Further, it underpins that it inevitably generates counter-reactions which colour the psycho-political mood for effective negotiations. We need only discern between the lines of the following passage to understand the intended message. One of the paragraphs in Al Hayat reads:
The Ethiopian government under President Meles Zenawi sees its future relation with Egypt as the most important component of its foreign relations. Predicting future tension in its relations with Egypt, it has designed strategies based on various strategic axes: defense-oriented military power, economic strength, arranging relations with active countries inside and outside the region, and preparing for building dams to control the Nile water as Turkey has done with the Euphrates water flowing to Iraq and Syria, except the Ethiopian water plans are more shrewd and clear of the Turkish chauvinism. 15
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CHAPTER FOUR
REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ROADBLOCKS TO AN ACCORD
THE MIDDLE EASTERN LEVERAGE OF EGYPT
Heretofore, Egypt has successfully used its Middle Eastern role and international clout which derives from the first condition to obtain the support of some conservative Arab states and Mediterranean countries and a few countries of the East and West for different reasons. Some of them are:
1. Its Middle Eastern role as a historical provider of essential leadership to the Arab world under the charismatic
leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser;
2. Its role of mediation under President Mubarak in the search for a negotiated solution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, which has made considerable progress, but is still not entirely problem-free; To the above may be added two
recent sub-regional roles of mediation which Egypt unsuccessfully tried to play. They include:
3. The Somali Crisis in which Egypt tried to play a role by supporting the Ali Mahdi group against General Aideed with
the assistance of the U.S. and the UN which had an immediate negative effect on Ethiopia’s negotiation efforts; and
4. Egypt’s desire to carve out a role of mediation in the conflict between Yemen and Eritrea over some Red Sea islands;
5. Egypt's overtures for membership in IGAD which most of the Horn countries were wary to accept due to its covert
and overt design wanting to play the role of the Big Brother in the politics of the Horn sub-region which was rejected on
grounds of Egypt's geographical distance from the Horn;
6. Its current membership in COMESA.
THE ALLIANCES AND LINK OF EGYPT WITH THE WEST
One reason for the grand role which Egypt wants to play is that it capitalizes too much on its newly won friendship with the west. This, according to some analysts, is exaggerated so much that it seems to lose sight of its regional friends on the following counts:
1. A key factor in this is Egypt's grandiose image of itself which has seriously blunted its ability to realistically assess
its relation with the constellation of countries around it. Take for instance its relationship with Sudan, Eritrea and
Ethiopia which it has tended to view from a pedestal of a superpower.
2. It had also played down the implications of the 1989 Sudanese coup due to its denigrating attitude toward Sudan
which it still views as an impoverished country incapable of exerting influence in the Arab world and the Horn of
Africa.
3. Yet, according to some analysts, contrary to the Egyptian assumption, however, through much of the 1990s the
Government of Sudan led by NIF seems to have enjoyed good contacts with individuals as well as institutions of
influence and financial clout. For instance, it has good contacts with Sunni Gulf Millionaires, Islamic banks,
businesses and a wide network of voluntary supporters who make substantial financial contributions to boost its
efforts as the region’s only Sunni state. How else could the NIF have survived the increasingly well orchestrated
pressure of the west which has cut off aid to it.
4. To the above may be added the psychological boost which the NIF has been receiving from religious ideologues
and Islamic militants who have been shuttling in and out of the country from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon,
Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan and other areas of Jihad Converts. This implies that Egypt also seems to have
less leverage on the attitude of financial institutions than is generally believed.
5. One evidence of the above is that Sudan has even been able to woo over some western countries like France and
had managed to strike a stand-by deals with the World Bank and IMF. The same applies to the EU which until
recently had adopted a carrot and stick policy of conditional support to it vis-à-vis isolation.
6. Further, Sudan has had good ties with Saudi Millionaires and with Russia and is canvassing hard to lure western
investors from Europe and North America to its mineral and energy sectors.
7. Yet, despite this startling evidence in favour of Sudan, the Egyptian Government seems to naively gloss over the
above facts or underestimated its vulnerability because of the Nile waters with which Hassan El Turabi threatened
when Egypt began massing its troops along the contested Sudanese-Egyptian border following the assassination
attempt on the life of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in June 1995.
8. Turabi’s threat was not taken seriously last time but it may not be dismissed with the same impunity next time
except that the NIF is losing ground.16
9. Equally significant is Egypt's attitude toward the other riparians. Egypt might believe, and rightly so, that it is the
gift of the Nile because as most old geography text books put it, “the Nile is Egypt and Egypt is the Nile." While the
first part may be true, nevertheless, arguably, other Nile countries like Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia may not agree
with the second part. They are bound to ask: a gift from whom?
10. They are also bound to ask: Egypt may be a gift of the Nile but is not the Nile also a gift to the riparians where it
originates and from where it carries rich alluvial soil to its terraced fields ?
11. Undoubtedly, the Nile is a large enough gift to be shared, but it must be shared fairly and equitably. The
imperative of the same justice should entitle the other Nile countries to harness parts of it to develop their agriculture
and improve their food security. The bilateral talks underway between some of the other Nile countries underline the
importance of this issue which Egypt needs to address together with the other Nile basin countries sooner rather than
later.
THE SUDAN FACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EASTERNIZATION OF THE NILE
The history of the relations between Egypt and Sudan, despite the 1959 bilateral agreement on the Nile which apparently brought the two countries together, has historically been punctuated by a series of conflicts stemming from divergent views and interests.
The convergence and divergence of interests between the two countries goes back to a period of the emergence of modern Sudan in the 16th century when it became part of North Africa, the Arab-orient and Hajjaz under the Fonji kingdom which advocated Islam and Arabic. This was made possible by the peaceful penetration of Arabs and their intermingling with the local population. Here, the Egyptian concern over the Nile and the idea of turning Sudan into a state under it or consanguine to it cannot be ruled out.
After the fall of the Allola kingdom of Nuba and later Saba, the Arabs are said to have gotten entrenched in the Sudan.
The north-south split in Sudan was also underlined by the Nile concern of maintaining a dehumanized south. This, not surpassingly, arose when the Egyptian leader Mohammed Ali Pasha occupied Sudan in 1814 and he was quick to introduce slavery. In fact, it was Keidev Saeed who later banned slavery, but even so it did last very long. Thus, slave trade remained a lucrative trade and the south was simply reserved as only a source of slaves. In fact, according to Samuel Baker who visited the Sudan between 1870-73, the south for all intents and purposes was not linked with the North in social or political terms.
A consideration of the control of the Nile must have also figured prominently when Egypt persuaded Britain to support the annexation of south Sudan to the North following the scramble for Africa of 1884.17
After the defeat of the Mahdists who ruled Sudan in the late 19th century by the Ango-Egyptian army, Britain and Egypt signed the Condominium Agreement of 1890 which gave them joint control over Sudan. Here again, the Nile issue had figured prominently in the minds of British and Egyptian leaders who had an even bigger colonial design for the Nile basin at large. In fact, the significance of the Ango-Egyptian Condominium of 1890 which turned Egypt into an Afro-Arab colonial power-broker which collaborated with metropolitan, colonial powers like Britain and Italy was, as we shall see later in the section on Eritrea and Somalia, to be a significant feature of Egyptian foreign policy in the decades before the independence of Sudan in 1956 and even later.18
It is also well-documented that the south was excluded from such vital negotiations in which the union of Sudan and Egypt was considered. This, for instance, was true of the 1952 Cairo meeting. It is also worthy of note that Egypt, more than Sudan, was more keen on the Union of the North and the South because of the Nile. Thus, while the Northern Government encouraged a policy of separation for the south in 1932, it was at the insistence of Egypt that the British Colonial Secretary, James Robertson, wrote to the British Government in 1946. Not surprisingly, again because of Egypt’s generalized concern over the Nile, Britain made a decision on the annexation of the south in December 1946.19
Again, as alluded to above, the Nile issue was a pivotal consideration in the attempt at creating a union of Egypt and Sudan which was finally rejected by the unionist government of the North in 1955. Bilateral agreement on the Nile and Egypt’s activities of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were also guided by the Nile issues.20
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE RED SEA FACTOR IN THE NILE ISSUE
CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN THE RED SEA REGION
Egypt has also continued to give the impression that its bargaining position on the Nile might be improved by its role as a major Red Sea actor. But, there are divergent conflicting interests which militate against this.
One reason is that, despite the end of the Cold War which, to some extent, has altered the political map of the region, Ethiopia also still remains one of the major Red Sea and Middle Eastern actors. This position was underpinned by the joint military pact which it signed with Eritrea prior to the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean conflict and the fact that Ethiopia is the only user of the Eritrean harbors which will willy nilly be reinforced after the conclusion of the war in favour of Ethiopia in June of 2000.
The above strategic position also has bearing on Ethiopia's sub-regional role in IGAD and its growing preoccupation with the issue of the Nile and on the Egyptian position which would require an integrated strategy. This view is echoed in Al Hayat which observes:
Egypt is concerned over Sudan and, as always, the Nile. It has not forgotten its former dreams of a Red Sea hegemony. Saudi Arabia, uneasy and almost xenophobic about regimes on the other side of the Red Sea, is looking for allies against Yemen which in turn is trying to build an anti-Saudi coalition to support its side in the differences over their largely unidentified border. Uneasy relation exists between Eritrea and Yemen over some Red Sea islands. This makes Egypt’s position on the choice of allies problematic.21
These conflicting Red Sea interests stand in the way of Egypt’s attempt to canvass support for its position on the Nile in the Middle East. It is thus in its interest to cultivate good ties with countries like Ethiopia which have direct stakes and plausible claims.
To the above may be added the lack of cohesion and volatility of the Middle East. For instance, in the last few years, both of the former Yemens had exploited oil fields close to regions claimed by Saudi Arabia; and in 1992 Saudi Arabia had warned several international oil companies prospecting in the Hadramaut, between the Bab al-Khali desert and the Arabian Sea that they were not in Yemen. This suggests that Saudi Arabia claims a considerable amount of the Hadramaut.
Eritrea and Yemen were involved in military confrontation on claims over the Hannish Islands which was subsequently refered to third party arbitration, which finally ruled in favour of jurisdiction Yemani over the major contested Hannish Island.22
Likewise, conflict over the demarcation of territorial boundaries between Eritrea and Djibouti had erupted and the problem remains unresolved, over-played by the territorial dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia which has led to open war and had defied international mediation efforts until mid- 2000.23
Similarly, the Yemenis have not forgotten the provinces of Asir and Nlajran ¾ lost to Saudi Arabia more than 60 years ago. Then there is an Islamic angle, with Sudan looking for wider support against its rivals in the region. Until 1992, the targets for alliances were Ethiopia and Djibouti and the two new states in the region Somaliland (still unrecognized by anyone) and Eritrea. Sudan and Eritrea are now at loggerheads with each other, but it is unlikely that this will be a permanent feature of their bilateral relations.24
THE EFFECT OF THE KEY RED SEA ACTORS AND OTHER REGIONAL CONCERNS ON A NILE AGREEMENT
Even on other counts, the view of the Red Sea less as a lake than a region still makes conflict, real or potential. There are considerable resources at stake --including known deposits of oil, gas, gold, silver, copper, iron ore, lead, chromium and zinc.25
Further, the super-powers may no longer vie for control of strategic areas, but it has not taken too long for others to try and emulate them. This provides great potential for the export of energy which Ethiopia can develop and which can become one of the key pillars of a new Nile agreement.26
Regional and local conflicts are on the increase in the New World Order, particularly in areas where the only superpower now sees less strategic significance for itself. There has also been a breakdown of the assumption that boundaries are sacrosanct, particularly in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Eritrea and Somaliland have been beneficiaries of this process. This does not make the issue of the Nile a taboo any longer.
The sheer length of the Red Sea and the number of countries which have their coasts bordering it also makes it a crucible of colliding and at times converging strategic interests.
Some 1,400 miles from the Gulf of Suez to the Bab el Mandeb, the Red Sea divides Africa from the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. It is 17 miles wide at its narrowest point at the southern end, and links the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal.27
Nine countries share its littoral, with coastlines ranging from a mere five miles (Jordan) or seven miles (Israel), to 1,125 (Saudi Arabia), 875 (Egypt), or 628 (Eritrea). Over 80% of its littoral lies within states of the Arab League, but they are by no means homogenous.
Over two-thirds of the nearly 400 islands in the Red Sea are also controlled by Arab states; the rest are now in Eritrea. They constitute a separate strategic factor. There were frequent reports in the 1970s and 1980s that Ethiopia had allowed Israel to set up bases in the Dahlak Archipelago, off Massawa.28
The USSR also had a facility there. No Israeli presence was confirmed then or now. After Mengistu, Israel has been quick to try and build up contacts with successor regimes. Most recently it has been assisting starving Somalis; as well as making overtures to Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both have reacted cautiously.
Israel had supported the anti-guerrilla struggle in Eritrea, as well as the southern Sudanese movement in the 1960s and 1980s as a way of weakening the regime in Khartoum. Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea are now no longer close to Sudan because of its ‘Islamism’. Throughout much of the 1990s these countries isolated Sudan but even that is likely to change because of shifting alliances in the Horn and the Red Sea area due to several factors including the recent conflicts between Sudan and Eritrea, Djibouti and Eritrea and Eritrea and Ethiopia.29
THE MIDDLE-EASTERNISATION OF THE NILE ISSUE
In 1990 and 1991, Sudan was internationally isolated because of its relations with Iraq and then Iran, and with “radical" Islam causing concern to Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well as the US. Reports of Iraqi arms supplies and of exchange of high level visits led to a cut in Saudi and Gulf state aid.
After the Gulf War, relations with Libya improved, and then at the end of 1991 close ties were established with Iran. President Rafsanjani visited Sudan in mid-December. An agreement was signed in July for joint exploration of Sudan’s oil.30
As a result, relations with Egypt were complicated over the resurrection of conflict over the Halaib triangle, a small border area on the Red Sea claimed by both countries. A propaganda war over the issue flared up in April and again in August 1992. Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt is, however, most concerned over the what it sees as “Sudanese attempts to destabilize it via its support for Islamists."31
Some analysts also suggest that in addition to the above, Egypt is worried by “the alleged plan of Sheik Hassan Al-Turabi to create a string of Islamic states across southern Ethiopia to the Indian Ocean." This had also kept Ethiopia and Eritrea wary of too close an alliance with Sudan, although neither wanted to get caught up in Sudan’s alleged anti-Saudi or anti-Egyptian posturings. At least in the conflict¾free years both were also concerned about all the assistance they could get to rebuild economies shattered by the years of fighting.32
Since 1991 Eritrea is a Red Sea actor. In 1991 President Issyas Afeworki singled out the Egyptian Government for rejecting the idea of Eritrean independence. The EPLF extended Eritrea’s territorial waters and seized dozens of Egyptian fishermen. Egypt subsequently became the first country to send in an ambassador to Eritrea.33
France came in for heavy criticism due to the Afar factor. Eritrea was concerned about the growth of Afar nationalism following the moves of the Afar guerrilla movement Front Pour La Restauration de l’unite et de la Democratie (FRUD) to conduct armed struggle in Djibouti. Any attempt to set up an Afar state would, of course, have immediate implications on Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti which does not make it easy for Egypt to canvass support for its Nile crusade.34
These Red Sea issues make it all the more necessary to arrive at a modus vivendi on the Nile issue now. Equally important, the lack of cohesion in the Middle-East also underlines the need for the riparians to arrive at a rapprochement.
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CHAPTER SIX
IMPACT OF HYDRO-POLITICS ON PSYCHO-POLITICS
THE IMPERATIVE OF ATTITUDINAL CHANGES ON THE NILE
As indicated earlier, the importance of the Nile issue is underpinned by its sheer span and length and the ten countries which are affected by it. It affects North Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire, Uganda, Sudan, Egypt, Rwanda and Burundi, Eritrea and according to some scholars the Central African Republic. This, at once, amplifies its geo-political significance.
To the above may be added the demographic size of the Nile basin which houses a population of more than 300 million people, has a catchment area of 3,030,700 km3s and a length of 6,825 kms (UN:1978:16), which ranks it as the longest or second longest river in the world.
The Nile also covers one tenth of the African continent which it traverses. But, while this provides an enhanced opportunity for cooperation among the ten countries which it brings together, it is the great contrast “between the riparian state which contributes almost all the water to the Nile and uses almost none (Ethiopia) and that which contributes nothing to its water (Egypt) and uses almost all of it" which is pregnant with anxieties about how the problem and its multiple issue should be addressed.
At the heart of the Nile issue are the attitudinal hurdles of governments which are preoccupied with the challenges of rapidly rising populations whose demand for water is set to continue to rise. This is exacerbated by the impact of distributional inequities. But, in addition to the distributional justice is the factor of the intelligent utilization of this scarce resource whose value will inevitably continue to rise. This calls for exploring new technically efficient ways of putting the water to use.
The experience and innovative proposals of hydrological engineers and those of people involved in the field would probably prove very useful here. Let us, for instance, look at the following interesting excerpt from The Economist of December/January 1995/1996 published under the title “Water in the Middle East: As Thick as Blood". On the methods of finding new sources of water supply the article suggests.
Finding untraditional new supplies, however difficult, is easier. Desalinating sea water or brackish water is an obvious, but expensive track; fine for oil-exporting countries, which have both the revenue to build the desalination plants and the energy to operate them, harder for others. Gradually, however, costs are coming down, making desalination a distinct possibility for countries, such as Israel, which have high income per head.35
The article in The Economist puts forward methods of economizing this scarce commodity stating, "Waste water is much more promising, a cheap resource that is almost always truly wasted. It need not be. On one rough estimate, half the water used in households could, if treated, be used again for irrigation. The trouble in many Arab towns is that there are virtually no facilities for collecting or treating waste water - in occupied Palestine sewerage was basic or nonexistent. But if treatment plants have to be built - as they do, for health and the environment - it is sensible to allow for the extra processing to provide irrigation water."36
The Economist also makes technical proposals requiring some investment, adding, 'A lot of domestic water that is wasted could be saved with better plumbing. With dual pipes for pure and impure water - all that good water, for example, used for flushing toilets - would be of help. Huge amounts of municipal water, more than half the supply in some cities, is lost either because it is stolen or because it trickles away through leaks in the pipes'.37
In the area of improving the utilization of water in farms, the Economist recommends the Israeli examples of innovative techniques identifying farming as the big thief, and where water could be saved by innovative techniques.38
It goes on: “Here Israel shows the way doubling its yield for half the water. It achieved this partly through new methods, partly through changing the crops to be grown, switching from everyday stuff to high value flowers or vegetables grown under glass." It cautions, “it makes no economic sense for countries that depend on irrigation to grow low-value food with high water needs.39 The value of the water used for irrigating wheat, sugarcane or rice can end up being many times greater than the value of the produce: there is no way that these crops can compete with food staples grown in countries where the water rains down free from the heavens."40
Some of the above proposals do require investment, but they would undoubtedly prove extremely useful. Improving the efficient use of the water of the Nile and making savings for greater distributional equity is thus important.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
NEW PROPOSALS AND MODALITIES FOR A NILE ACCORD
At the heart of the prolonged postponement of an earnest search to a negotiated resolution of the issue of the Nile has been the dismal performance of past regimes in confronting the issue squarely and pragmatically. In the 1960s, the issue was first overshadowed by the Pan-African commitment of the Haile Selassie regime which took precedence over Ethiopia’s national water security interests and concerns. At least a serious attempt could have been made to enhance Ethiopia’s protest at being excluded from the bi-partite agreement of 1959.
The same could also be said about the period of the Derg which was preoccupied with its survival as a polity rather than other more paramount issues of national concern. As recently observed, although "the Nile has always been at the center of Ethio-Egyptian relations, a veneer has also always been maintained in an attempt to conceal the real essence of the relations between the two countries. For the Derg regime, which has always been on a shopping spree for weapons, its convoluted sense of priorities did not allow it to focus on what should have been one of the top priorities in the foreign policy of any Ethiopian government."41
A genuine attempt to break the code of silence which had governed the Nile issue for far too long than is desirable did not therefore come until some two or three years ago when the EPRDF government assumed power in Ethiopia. The move was as inevitable as it was necessary for the reasons outlined below.
For one thing Egypt can no longer pretend not to know what Ethiopia considers to be the central issue in Ethio-Egyptian relations. The premise for fruitful relations between the two countries is the full acknowledgment of the fact that the status quo with respect to the Nile cannot be maintained indefinitely. This is what the Framework for General Co-operation between Ethiopia and the Arab Republic of Egypt signed in Cairo by the heads of state of the two countries on 1 July 1993 essentially represents. Notwithstanding the very many fictitious reports and commentaries either out of malice or ignorance about Ethiopia’s rights having been compromised, serious talks on the issue between Egypt and Ethiopia have, in reality, not even began. The above mentioned document, though important on the symbolic realm, was neither a binding agreement nor has it settled all vital issues between the two countries. As far as Ethiopia is concerned, the significance of the signing of the document is that it represents the first ever attempt by the two sides to tackle the very vital issue between them whose resolution cannot be delayed.42
It is also important that the issue of the Nile is dealt with diplomatic finesse and in a spirit of mutual respect between the two countries. Indeed as observed quite correctly "It would, on the other hand, be rather unhelpful for Ethiopia, as well as for regional and continental security and co-operation, for all dealings between Egypt and Ethiopia to be made contingent upon the full resolution of the issue of water between them. What is important is that tangible progress towards addressing the inequity that the status quo constitutes is made and concrete efforts exerted in a transparent manner to change the unnatural situation whereby a country, Ethiopia, from whose territory 85% of the water of the Nile originates, so far has been ignored."43
The current Ethiopian Government has so far showed a commitment to the issue, but it is also fully cognizant and appreciative of the need to resolve it more with reason than passion.44
Indeed, as the author of the same article rightly argues, “from all indications" it is very clear that the Transitional Government was very much determined to change this situation. Neither vacuous bravado, nor resignation growing out of temporary lack of capacity, should be the approaches that govern Ethiopia’s policy vis-à-vis the Nile, which obviously is the most challenging issue for this generation of Ethiopians. Bravado on this issue is the result of ignorance of the complex political, legal (although murky) and one should add, of the human considerations, that are raised by transboundary rivers.
Further, as the author of the same article adds, "the hackneyed phase 'our water' is neither false nor completely true, for the river Nile also belongs to others. The point is to get what Ethiopia is entitled to, and Ethiopia has not only failed to do so far but had for long failed to pursue it in earnest as a goal. In this regard, the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan is a sad commentary not only on the lack of vision and of fairness of others, but also on how Ethiopia had been enfeebled in the past. The record of the Haile Selassie regime and of the dictatorship that followed would always remain tainted on this issue alone."45
Given the above, Egypt’s best deal is to be amenable to an open and transparent discussion on the matter. It could not hope to find a regime which governs less by passion and anxiety than the present one. The truth about the current development is also that Ethiopia’s choices are determined by the demand of its rising population which has great bearing on its attitude.46 The question is: Should it be necessary for Ethiopia to accept with resignation the gross imbalance that the prevailing status quo on the Nile represents?
Indeed, those whose advantage the status quo serves and who continue to bank on their influence on international financial institutions might feel that given financial constraints, Ethiopia’s options are only two: to indulge in empty rhetoric and puerile polemics, or to accept and live with a fait accompli". However, as the above mentioned article concludes, this is myopic, and the foreign policy of the Transitional Government on the issue is so far reassuring.47
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CHAPTER EIGHT
AGREEMENT AS A WAY OF REMOVING OR MINIMIZING CONFLICT
WATER SCARCITY AND THE RISKS OF CONFLICT
All the aforesaid collaborative ventures are more likely to deliver good results if and when there is an agreement. What is more, the risk of the incidence of conflicts, which are linked with water, is likely to be considerably minimized through a rapprochement and consideration of mutual needs leading to agreements.
Further, the potential linkage between water scarcity and conflicts cannot be played down. Aaron T. Wolf, Assistant Professor of Geography at Alabama University, has rightly emphasized the point below from a global perspective:
1. Because of water’s preeminent role in survival, political conflicts over international water resources tend to be
particularly contentious.
2. The intensity of conflict over water can be exacerbated by a region’s geographical or hydropolitical landscape.
3. Each of the three major waterways of the arid and volatile Middle East—the Nile, the Jordan, and the
Tigris-Euphrates systems—have elements of all of these exacerbating factors.
4. Scarce water resources have already been at the heart of much of the bitter and occasionally armed, conflict
endemic to the region.
5. One fact is indisputable: the region is running out of water. And the people who have built their lives and
livelihoods on a reliable source of fresh water are seeing the shortage of this vital resource impinge on all aspects
of the tenuous relations between economic sectors, and between individuals and their environment.48
HYDROPOLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
One should also point out that the Nile issue and the involvement of the Nile basin countries is likely to be affected by global hydropolitics, particularly by the Middle East. Wolf has endorsed this view as follows:
1. It was in the beginning of this century, as the competing nationalism of the region’s inhabitants began to re-emerge on the ruins of first the Ottoman then the British Empire, that the quest for resources took on a new and vital dimension.
2. All the three basins have experienced periods of both water-related conflict and cooperation. The Aswan High Dam on the Nile, for example, has been a cause of contention between Egypt and Sudan for decades, but it has also led to the only international water sharing treaty on the river—the 1959 Nile Water Treaty.
3. However, the Treaty takes little account of the other nine riparian states—many of which are beginning to develop the Nile waters within their territory—creating vital need for the process of conflict resolution to continue and expand.
4. Similarly, Syria and Iraq came close to armed conflict over the increasingly developed waters of the Tigris-Euphrates in 1975, and only intense mediation on the part of Saudi Arabia was able to break the increasing tension and avert violence.49
A MENU OF OPTIONS OF SOLUTIONS
1. TECHNICAL AND POLICY OPTIONS
In view of the above, one needs to take stock of all options that are likely to lead to possible solutions. Indeed, as Wolf rightly argues “there is an entire array of solutions of water resource limits that can be considered, ranging from agricultural to technological to economic and public policy solutions, but they fall under the same two basic categories: increase supply or decrease demand."50
2. THE PEACE PROCESS APPROACH
The importance of bilateral agreements between Egypt and Ethiopia, and Ethiopia and Sudan is also underpinned by the fluid frontiers of global politics which are prone to affect different issues including water-based relations. For instance,
1. The Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union realigned political alliances in the Middle East and finally made face-to-face peace talks between Arabs and Israelis possible:
2. During the bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbours, it was agreed that multilateral negotiations would also be undertaken on five regional subjects, including water resources.
3. Since the opening session of the multilateral talks in Moscow in January 1992, the Working Group on water resources, with the Untied States holding the gavel, has been the venue for raising problems of water supply and demand among three of the five parties to the bilateral negotiations.
3. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE EQUITY APPROACH
In view of the unforeseeable future which might introduce new variables to the already complex issue, the opportunity of an agreement need not be over-emphasized. Besides, the equity factor and need-based distributional justice should always provide the bench-mark. Aaron T. Wolf has emphasized this point stating, “measures that have historically been used to promote water sharing equity include rights-based measures, largely addressed by the international legal community; needs-based measures, particularly using population, arable land, or historic use parameters; and measures based on economic definitions of efficiently."51
4. COOPERATIVE WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
Besides, the equity factor might be assisted by a regional water development plan, which according to Aaron Wolf might take the following steps:
1. Separation of the control of water resources to address past and present grievances by
Negotiating property rights to existing resource,
Guaranteeing control of a water source adequately to meet future needs, and,
Addressing the issue of equity within the design of any cooperative project.
2. Examine the details of initial positions for options to induce cooperation. This may be done by closely studying the assumptions and beliefs behind the starting points. It might be possible to glean clues about how to induce some movement within the “bargaining mix" or the range within which bargaining can take place, for each party.
These underlying assumptions and beliefs may also point to the creative solutions necessary to move from distributive bargaining (“win-lose") over the amount of water each entity should receive via integrative bargaining (“win-win"), wherein opportunities for mutual gain are sought.
3. Design a plan or project, starting with small-scale implicit cooperation, and building toward ever-increasing integration, always keeping pace with (presumably) warming political relations. Building on that small-scale cooperation, and keeping the concern of equity and control firmly in mind, projects might be developed to increase integration within the watershed, or even between watersheds over time.
5. OBSERVATIONS
First, awareness of the following facts about experience in other areas such as the Middle East might prove helpful. One is that the flow of water ignores political boundaries, and appropriate measures to attain water equity have eluded disciplinary boundaries in the Middle East.
Second, as Wolf hastens to add, “this gloomy glimpse of the history of hydropolitics in the Middle East may portray the probable future for many of the world’s 200 international river basins."
Third, the bottom line as Wolf rightly emphasizes is “without agreed-upon criteria for fair ownership and distribution of such a vital resource, many may come to experience the sentiments of Bryon: ‘Till taught by pain, men know not water’s worth.’"52
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CHAPTER NINE
THE WAY FORWARD TO BREAK THE PSYCHO-POLITICAL IMPASSE
NEW FORAYS FOR AN AGREEMENTS
For better or worse, the Nile will continue to be the dominant theme on the agenda of the riparian countries during the early 21st century. More so, for the countries that are most affected by it, vis-à-vis the countries that contribute most to it and benefit least from it and those that cannot do without it.
Silence might prolong the status quo a wee bit, but it will certainly not provide a long-term solution to the complex issues surrounding it. It is, therefore, imperative that the following measures, inter alia, be considered:-
1. A logical start is to break the code of silence by confronting the issue candidly and openly and with a desire of finding a solution which takes stock of the needs and anxieties of all concerned. The magic words in such deliberations would be mutual trust, concern and transparency in the way the issue is addressed. In this effort, the unbiased views of scholars and experts will provide many insightful clues on how the issues of equity and efficient utilization should be addressed.
2. Some of the general views mentioned earlier as ways of improving the utilization of the water of the Nile would certainly prove useful by way of making more water available to those countries which are not getting it now.
3. The above would certainly help address the key issue of equity to some extent, but it also needs to be augmented by other water management proposals which are endorsed by all countries concerned individually as well as collectively.
4. In the discussion below an attempt should be made to consider divergent views on how a new Nile waters accord should look like. For instance, according to Dale Wittington, John Waterbury and Elizabeth McClelland, the future accord should be predicated on expanding the usable yields, encouraging interdependencies and allocations of water rights including provisions for apportionment of water especially in times of scarcity and the establishment of principles to guide this. The authors argue: "Nile water management is not strictly a zero-sum game. There is some scope for cooperative behavior that would increase the long-term yield, and a new agreement could ensure that such possibilities are fully exploited. The most promising possibility is the construction of the Blue Nile Reservoirs in Ethiopia."53
5. The cooperative venture should be based on comparative advantages of all riparians. For instance, "One of the numerous advantages of these reservoirs is that they would enable over-year storage to be shifted from the Aswan High Dam Reservoir upstream so that evaporation losses would be much reduced. In the upper Blue Nile region, evaporation rates are approximately 50 percent of those in Sudan and Egypt. Reductions in evaporation loss would be realized both through lower evaporation rates and through lower surface-to-volume ratios in the canyon sites of the Blue Nile Reservoirs."54
At present, only crude estimates of the possible water savings are available, but they would probably be in the order of 4 to 5 BCM per year. Another opportunity for regional cooperation is the elimination of the Jebel Aulia Reservoir on the White Nile where annual evaporation losses are currently about 2.8 BCM.55
6. But, in order to take steps of minimizing such losses the riparian countries which are most concerned should sit together and recognize that such losses do indeed exist and that they constitute serious problems for their future relations.56
7. As indicated above, calculation on reallocation should be based on two key assumptions; namely that 6 BCM be derived from long-term increased yields obtained via the reduction of losses at the Jebel Aulia Reservoir and the construction of the Blue Nile Reservoir.
8. The snag about the above suggestion is that it can take decades to develop, but as a way out of this Wittington and the others suggest an interim allocation stating that the new agreement could be structured in a staggered fashion “so that some portion of Ethiopia’s share only becomes available as the Blue Nile projects are completed."57
9. This suggestion, they add "would allow Ethiopia to obtain internal financing for irrigation schemes of the Blue Nile projects without interfering with existing water use in Egypt or Sudan." To this, the latter should contribute positively. The obvious rationale for positive cooperation on the part of Egypt is that impasse and delay are counter productive, as a problem postponed is indeed not a problem solved.58
10. To the above must be added consideration of future climatic change the burden of which should be equitably considered, as it is likely to be caused by the long-term neglect of environmental considerations.
11. As the authors of the article hasten to add, “Any new agreement about the allocation of the long-term yield of the river among the riparian countries could be made contingent on the completion of these two projects that would increase available waters supplies."59
They go on to add, "Various computations should be made and options looked into. For example, as Wittington (et al) suggest for purposes of discussion, let us assume that the increase in long-term yield resulting from both the construction of the Blue Nile Reservoirs and the elimination of evaporation losses at the Jebel Aulia Reservoir will be six BCM. If we take the conservative position that none of the other water conservation projects on the White Nile will be completed due to environmental and political concerns, then (based on the historic record of the last century) the available long-term yield can be estimated at about 80 BCM (measured at Aswan, after deduction for the remaining evaporation losses from the Aswan Dam Reservoir)".60
12. As the same time, the authors make it clear that several key steps on ways and means of negotiating the shares of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia can be explored:
One line of reasoning they put is that of making Ethiopia’s share of the Nile water at least equal to Sudan’s, based on the argument that both countries have more potentially irrigable land and that Ethiopia’s population is approximately twice as large as Sudan’s. This approach results in somewhat more water being allocated to Ethiopia, with the following approximate allocation: 52 BCM for Egypt, 14 BCM for Sudan and 14 BCM for Ethiopia.61
13. Another suggestion is one considered from a vantage point of splitting the difference (assuming for purposes of illustration) that Ethiopia receives 12 BCM measured at Aswan which gives Sudan 15.5 BCM and Egypt 52.5 BCM.62 The rationality for this reallocation is underscored by two factors; namely that:
a) Egypt would only give 5% of its existing allocation in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Egypt’s historical rights to a majority of the Nile water.
b) Current Nile basin countries will sustain their existing allocations.
Whether Ethiopia as the supplier of 85% of the water of the Nile would accept the 12 or 14 BCM allocations has yet to be negotiated. One optimistic signal is that Ethiopia’s water needs are not as desperate as those of Egypt.63
14. There are also other considerations which might prompt Ethiopia to be amenable to such a proposal. One thing is that Egypt’s energy requirement which is currently growing at 6% a year could make it an exporter of energy to Egypt at an agreed price. This proposal will have no effect whatsoever on the volume of water which flows to Egypt. It is also among several proposals put forward for a basin-wide cooperation which Egypt considers as one of its strategies.
While all these proposals are very constructive and encouraging, the key to their realisation lies in the removal of the psycho-political hurdles and the starting of a candid review of the Nile issue in all its complexity. Given this change of attitude, the Nile offers great potential to all concerned including Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia and the other Nile riparian states.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION
SETTING THE TONE FOR A NILE AGREEMENT
An earnest effort at breaking the current impasse on the Nile should begin by removing the current psycho-political roadblocks to dialogue and taking stock of the commonalties. Such an awareness may for instance include:
1. Recognition of the characteristics of the Nile issue as part of the socio-political, cultural and emotional history of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.
2. Awareness of the fact that the Nile is the basis of the physical survival of Egypt.
3. Cognizance of the fact that the Nile is the central symbol of Egypt’s national cohesion, particularly in times of conflict and that it is used for giving meaning and direction to its foreign policy.
4. An appreciation of the positive achievements and measures taken by Egypt to improve the efficient utilization of water.
5. Recognition of the efforts being made to minimize water wastage with a view to improving the total water resources of the basin which would be a good basis for an equitable distribution of the Nile water among the riparians including Ethiopia.
6. Freeing the Nile from becoming a hostage of government policies or politics.
7. A genuine appreciation of the real issues at stake, namely that the bone of contention resides in the Egyptian assertion of historical right and the Ethiopian demand for justice.
8. A sober recognition of the fact that neither the claim of historical rights nor that of arithmetic justice alone can be a good basis for compromise.
9. By seeking a solution in the middle ground of both. From Ethiopia’s point of view the rationale for this is that bad justice is better than no justice.
10. Recognition of the fact that environmental depletion in Ethiopia implies a reduction in the total volume of the water of the Nile and therefore of the volume of water which flows to Egypt.
11. Raising the awareness of all riparians about dire consequences of too much short-termism which does not augur well for future collaboration.
12. Persuading international financial institutions to have a long haul perspective which encourages investment in the environment, irrigation and soil and water conservation.
13. Convincing financial institutions about the risk of lack of foresight by way of blocking long-term investment for all riparians. Showing them that loans destined for investment in less vital sectors is counter productive for the future of all involved.
14. The main task should be one of jointly exploring their common terrain such as the production of hydro-power which is of great significance to meet the rising demands of energy of all riparians.
15. They should make serious efforts to persuade riparians about the risk of unilateral action by any of them. Further, all attempts should be made not to Middle-Easternize the Nile because its ripples have spread wide enough.
16. One should also realize the fact that the Nile is an intensely emotional issue both for Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and the other riparians, though in varying degrees. Thus attempts should be made to deal with it with less passion and more rationality and balance. This should result from analysis and honest recognition of the sticking points via the establishment of regimes ownership, user rights and the balance between need and distributional justice. Further it should derive from:
a. realizing that a prolonged impasse is counter-productive to all riparians and showing that 'a problem postponed is not a problem solved';
b. showing that in the long run the status quo is not tenable;
c. a sober recognition of the value of the peace dividends of an early agreement by way of opening avenues of constructive cooperation.
17. Pursuing the motto 'if you want to prevent war strengthen peace' and by:
a. recognizing the fact that the Nile is a case of latent conflict and not an active one; and making all attempts to prevent its escalation to an open conflict;
b. making all see that a protracted conflict or war over the Nile will only prove the medical dictums "The operation was successful but the patient died" i.e. it will be a lose/lose situation in which the means will not justify the end;
c. The emphasis here is co-existence. We can choose our friends, but we cannot choose our neighbours and co-basin partners. The common challenge which all riparians face is therefore one of making their neighbours and co-basin patterns their friends.
WHY THIRD PARTIES SHOULD PUSH FOR AGREEMENTS
Here, one should in passing say a word or two about the international environment which has not been conducive for the signing of an agreement, for which Egypt may not entirely be blamed. One is the colonial history and the role of the metropolitan powers (in this case, the UK) which did not see during the colonial period the justice of laying the ground work for both countries to reach an amicable rapprochement in the future.
Indeed, it might seem naïve to expect a hegemonic foreign power to be altruistic and rational about issues like water-sharing in the future, because the fate of the colonial enterprise was still unknown. Admittedly it was not characteristic of any of the colonial powers (to be fair to Britain) to engage in such constructive future arrangements among would-be ex-colonial states during the 19th century either.
Nevertheless, there is no denying the fact that colonial rule had planted the seeds of the injustice which of has bedevilled the Nile issue up to now. One should bear in mind that even the 1959 agreement between Egypt and the Sudan way not singed until after the independence of Egypt in 1952 and the Sudan in 1956.
No point will indeed be made by lamenting the damage of the colonial past, but at least one redeeming element can come out of gleaning the dustbin of history, namely that the powers that did not carryout much constructive acts in the past could assume more responsibility by persuading countries like Egypt to move toward a more pragmatic and mutually beneficial acts of collaboration.
The same may not indeed be said about the United Sates which was not a metropolitan colonial power with jurisdiction over Egypt or any of the other riparians, but the US could also play a positive role of leveraging Egypt to conclude an agreement with Ethiopia. This, indeed, is very positive for the US and its allies. This collaboration is likely to benefit even other Middle Eastern states like Israel due to the development of the Nile basin area as a potential source of food production in their vicinity.
Besides, the environmental dividends of a green Nile basin area with at least a stable level of water flow cannot be played down. Unfortunately, up to now the US has opted in favor of silence because of its position both as a lower and upper riparian sharing the same river with Canada (upstream) and Mexico (downstream).
But, even inspite of the benefits which might accrue to the US from not breaking the code of silence and learning from future agreements, the US by virtue of its global role of leadership should take the moral high ground of putting gentle pressure on Egypt to sign a bilateral agreement with Ethiopia. Needless to add, the US is also more likely to benefit from a win-win situation between Egypt and Ethiopia and the other riparians in the region.
GLOBAL IMPERATIVES FOR AN AGREEMENT
The need for arriving at a timely modues viviendi leading to a negotiated bilateral agreement is also underscored by the rapidly changing global water resources situation which has given rise to mounting concern and anxiety. The seriousness of this issue of international preoccupation was recently underlined by the World Water Commission whose alarming report points at a very pessimistic and realistic picture both on the current and future situation. The point is highlighted by the following alarming facts:
1. Just 2.5% of the world’s water is fresh, and two-thirds of all fresh water that does exist is locked in ice caps and
glaciers.
2. Of the remaining amount, some two-thirds is lost to evaporation.
3. From what is left, some 20% is in areas too remote for human access, while of the other 80%, three-quarters comes
at the wrong times and place – through monsoons, hurricanes and floods, and can only be partially captured for human
use.
4. The renewable fresh water supply on land-water made available year after year by rainfall—is less than 0.08 of one
percent of the total water on the planet.
5. Of this tiny fraction of water available for human use, some two-thirds is devoted to agriculture, a figure that rises to
more than 80%, sometimes 90%, in many developing countries, where the real water crunch is coming.
6. The world is facing a water gap and failing to bridge that gap will be higher food prices and expensive food imports
for water scarce countries that are predominantly poor.
7. Already, 800 million people are going hungry because they cannot afford to buy food.
8. 1.4 billion people live without clean drinking water.
9. 2.3 billion people lack adequate sanitation.
10. Seven million die yearly from disease linked to water.
11. Half the world’s rivers and lakes are seriously polluted.
12. Important rivers like the Yangtze do not flow to the sea for much of the year because upstream withdrawals and
food shortages could create millions of environmental refugees.
13. Currently, nearly 450 million people in 29 countries face water shortage problems, a figure that is projected to jump
to nearly 2.5 billion people by 2050.
14. Two-thirds of the world’s population live in areas receiving only one-quarter of the world’s annual rainfall. For
example, about 20 percent of the global annual rain runoff each year occur in the Amazon Basin, a vast region with
fewer than 10 million people, a tiny fraction of the world population.64
THE RATIONALE OF WATER DEFICIENCY AS AN ARGUMENT FOR AN AGREEMENT
Exacerbating the above is also the water gap and growing pressure of food insecurity underscored by demographic growth, the high utilization of water by agriculture and the limits of what science and technology can do by way of increasing productivity perennially. The seriousness of the issue of water deficiency is further underlined by the following facts:
1. Water scarcity, not shortage of land, will be the main constraint to increase agricultural production in developing
countries in the coming years.
2. In the last thirty years, the world has been able to feed its burgeoning population only because of the science-driven
Green Revolution which more than doubled food grain production.
3. The increase came mostly on irrigated lands, which comprise less than a fifth of all cropped area but produce some
45% of the world food. As a result, the number of people receiving less than 2,100 calories per day, a standard index of
malnutrition, has fallen by three-quarters.
4. Irrigated agriculture will have to provide 70% of the additional food needed for an additional 3 billion people expected
by 2025.
5. But even if irrigation reaches a water use efficiency levels of 70% at the basin level everywhere (from an average of
45%) we would still need 17% more water.
6. Depending on rain-fed agriculture would cause massive environmental damage: more land would have to be
cleared; forests would be lost; habitats would be destroyed; and biodiversity would be threatened.
7. Every hectare of irrigated land represents 2.5 hectares of pasture or forest that need not be developed for
agriculture.
8. Agriculture itself is dependent of aquifers, which are being used at an unsustainable rate. For example, according to
World Water Commission, India is using twice as much water from its aquifers as is being replenished naturally. That
country could lose a quarter of its total food production by 2025. Libya consumes 3.7 times its renewable water
resources, 75% of it for agriculture.
The importance of arriving at an agreement is also underscored by its timeliness because of the great scope which exists for collaboratively combating the problems which water deficiency or scarcity might occasion.65
The scope for collaboration and a win-win situation is highlighted by the following measures which can contribute toward a solution to the problem of water scarcity. This may, inter alia, include the following key considerations of global significance:
1. Making desalinization affordable;
2. Using remote sensing to find more quantities of water it where it is thought to exist;
3. Finding more useful collection technologies of rain water;
4. Finding more efficient and more affordable way to recycle waste water;
5. Finding ways to replenish groundwater;
6. Developing toilets that don’t use water to deal with human waste;
7. Developing technology to transport fresh water over long distances, including across oceans;
8. Using biotechnology to breed less thirsty and more drought-resistant plants; and
9. Using computers to integrate the different uses of water.66
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1
The Economist, December-January 1996/97.
2
Whittington, Dale (Et.al) Toward A Nile Accord, Ethioscope, 1994 Vol.1 No.1 September, 1994
3-4
Ibid
5
The Geopolitics of the Monopolized Division of the Nile Waters," Resource and Conflict in the Middle East, P. 40.
6
Daniel, Kendie, Egypt and Hydropolotics of the Blue Nile. Addis Tribune, August 6, 1999
7
Al Hayat, August 16, 1996
8
Daniel, Kendie, Egypt and Hydropolotics of the Blue Nile. Addis Tribune, August 6, 1999
9-11
Ibid
12
Robbins, Eliane Water, Water Everywhere. E-Magazine: The Environment September/October
13
Resource And Conflict In The Middle East, “The Geopolitics Of The Monopolized Division Of The Nile Waters" P. 40
14
Daniel, Kendie, Egypt and Hydropolotics of the Blue Nile. Addis Tribune, August 6, 1999
15
Al Hayat, August 16, 1996
16
The Eye On Ethiopia And The Horn Of Africa, ‘Egypt And The Horn’
17-20
Ibid
21
Al Hayat, Loccit, P. 4.
22
Key Issues Of Ethiopia’s National Security Concern," A Paper By Dr. Kinfe Abraham Presented At The Diplomatic Conference Of The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, 1996
23-31
Ibid
32
State of the Horn, Yearbook, 1997
33-34
Ibid
35
The Economist, London, Dec/Jan 1995/96
36-40
Ibid
41
MoFA, Ethioscope, September, 1994
42-47 Ibid
48
Wolf, Aaron T., Hydropolitics of the Middle East, Website
49-52
Ibid
53
Guariso, Whittington, 1987
54
United States Bureau of Reclamation, 1964
55
Whittington, McClelland, et al 1992
56-63
Ibid
64
World Water Commission, Website
65-66
Ibid
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The Nile: resource evaluation, resource management, hydropolitics and legal issues. London, 1990
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Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley. Syracuse, NS, 1979
Ø Legal and institutional arrangements for managing water resources in the Nile Basin; Water Resources Development, Vol. 3.3, No.2, 1987
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