Sunday, May 01, 2011

awate.com Interview: Meles Zenawi Sizes Up The Region


Following is a transcribed interview awate.com conducted with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on Wednesday, April 13, 2011, in his office in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. Saleh “Gadi” Johar, founder and publisher of awate.com, conducted the interview. For ease of reading, we have numbered the questions.
The following is a transcribed  interview awate.com conducted with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on Wednesday, April 13, 2011, in his office in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. Saleh “Gadi” Johar, founder and publisher of awate.com, conducted the interview. For ease of reading, we have numbered the questions.

1. I didn’t see other parts of Ethiopia, but in Addis Ababa, there is a visibly frantic development activity going on. My question is: some countries went through such rapid real estate development that was followed by a catastrophic collapse of the real estate market and thus of the economy—do you think such a collapse would happen in Ethiopia?

No. Because it is not a significant part of the economy. The real estate sector is obviously growing and not just in Addis; it is growing across the country. But it is a small part of the economy, no more than 10 to 15% of the local loans given by the private banks. Public banks which provide more than 50-60% of the total loan do not provide any loan for real estate. So it will be on the range of 5-7% of the bank loans. Therefore, I do not see a real estate bubble appearing. But we are keenly following the issue. In spite of the big construction activities that are going on in Addis, there is a massive shortage of housing in this city.

2. Does the big number of new hotels on every corner of the city reflect a comparable increase in tourism? Then, I have an observation (you can consider it a personal complaint): why are Ethiopian hotels the only unfair establishments for tourists and visitors? I mean, when I buy gas, shop at a retail store, at restaurants and everything else, I am charged the same prices as an any Ethiopian for the same service or product that I get, but when I go to a hotel, they tell me: if you are an Ethiopian, you pay 200 birr but if you carry a foreign passport, you pay $40 (which is 640 birr, more than 300%) for the same room and the same bed?

On the first question, hotels space…there is still an acute shortage of hotel space, still. It is mainly related to conference tourism. A lot of conferences are held here in Addis.  And when there are conferences we have problems accommodating customers to the extent that we sort of block certain hotels for official delegation and that creates havoc. So there is acute shortage of hotel space here in town particularly at the higher end. But there is significant investment in the hotel industry happening also in the higher end. 3 or 4 additional five star hotels are coming in. And so that should reduce the pressure.

Now the hotel business…I am not going to justify this; I am going to try to explain it without justifying it. Whenever I go to foreign countries, including Rome, they tell me–for meetings, they tell me the rates during those meetings are much higher than the normal rates…they tell me, this is even true of New York. Because the occupancy rate becomes higher during meeting, they charge higher during meetings than is the case normally. So there is a distinction in every hotel. The rates vary from time to time. Now what these hotels in Ethiopia do is use the local customers as local fillers from whom they do not make much money and use foreigner, and the only way they distinguish foreigners is by passport. And if there is a consolation to your predicament, it is the fact that if you had been an American of Ethiopian origin, you would still have faced the foreign rate, it is just your passport that distinguishes you as a foreigner and nothing else. The justification behind it is that they make the real money not from Ethiopians that they use as a sort of gap fillers, but out of the foreign tourists. And the other justification is that on balance, the rates here are much higher than comparable cities. But I cannot justify it.

3. I have been visiting Addis Ababa frequently since 1991 (excluding the period between 1998 and 2008): there are still a considerable number of beggars and crippled persons, but I have noticed a drastic decrease. Why is that, did their economic situation improve? Or in the case of crippled persons, I think most are polio and such victims, has the healthcare situation improved in Ethiopia that much?

What is happening is that the people who used to come from every corner of the country without any specific job or opportunity of getting a job but to engage in begging on the streets in the hope and expectation that they would be able to survive on the alms given to them,  a good number of them are getting alternative sources of income. We have trained some them and engaged them in coblbestone working in the city; some of them have gone back to their village where the opportunities are significantly higher now. And over time, we are beginning to institutionalize support for those who do not have the means to survive on their own. We didn’t want to take a drastic step against it, because of the history—I don’t know if you know the history, of Addis- but what used to happen, when I was a student, when there was a meeting, this ugly face of Ethiopia will be cleaned off Addis streets for a few days and eventually they come back again. We felt that this would be insulting, to everybody, including the victims themselves. They are not begging because they love begging, but because they do not have other opportunities. So it took a lot of time, because we wanted to do it in a sort of a natural way…and that is happening across the country. Step by step, those who are unemployed, but can work, are encouraged to be trained and given an opportunity to work. Those who can go back to their villages are also encouraged to go to their villages. And those that cannot fend for themselves in any way, then we encourage institutionalize support for them.

4.  A sustainable economy needs efficient use of assets, why is the concept of maintenance so poor in Ethiopia? Don’t you think you are losing so much man hours and money to replace broken assets whose life span could have been elongated with proper maintenance—this goes to cars, lifts, street lamps, sewage, etc…

I wouldn’t be surprised if these assets happen to be government assets.

5.  Most probably yes.

I would be surprised if these assets are private ones. In terms of government assets, the culture is to build, use and dispose. Maintenance has not been a major aspect of it. In recent years we have taken steps for maintenance work to maintain power installations, and telecommunications, infrastructure in general. We have specifically allocated funds for maintenance in these basic infrastructure projects. But housing is managed on the basis of its own income. The government has inherited a lot of houses, and we are not building new ones except low cost housing and that is transferred to owners immediately so that they take care of it. But we still have government houses that are managed by public enterprise, and because this institution has no future—it has a past but no future—sooner or later it will disappear because we don’t have plans to own government housing indefinitely. Over time, we will either bulldoze it of transfer it to the private sector. And there has not been a culture of maintaining these housing, so public assets are not properly cared for specially real estate type of assets of the government. And some of it might come to the private sector; after all, those who run private housing might have been working in the public sector and sort of inherited the culture from where they were working initially.

6. Unemployment. How severe is it and what is being done to alleviate it?

In terms of unemployment, we have been perhaps lucky in the sense that rural-urban migration is extremely low, probably the lowest in the Africa. This is partly a reflection of our focus on rural development and land ownership system in Ethiopia. So the influx from the rural areas that, traditionally, created portions of unemployment in urban area, it is not happening anymore. The young people from the rural areas stay behind in the urban areas after they complete their education. Most of them don’t go back, to the rural areas, but they have some education. So unemployment in the urban areas is much lower than it was, let’s say, five years ago. Second reason why it is lower is because we have network programs here, small and micro enterprise sector, we train young people, engage them in all sorts of public projects to give skills, employment opportunity and startup capital as a result of the work that they do. That has lessened the pressure but I can only say that the pressure has been reduced, it is not removed, it is never removed, and in countries such as Ethiopia you don’t have unemployment insurance programs. So it remains to be a significant challenge but not as big as it used to be five or six years ago.

7.  Recently there is shortage of cooking oil, sugar and other the price of other essential food stuff is increasing…sometimes beyond the reach of the poor. How are you facing this difficulty?

Edible oil and sugar: We are at a tussle with the private sector who were distributing edible oil and sugar, because it had been monopolized by a small group of about five businessmen and they were charging exorbitant prices (what is called rent-seeking), and so we had to distribute it through cooperatives, and the traditional channels of distribution has interrupted sugar and edible oil. So we had a shortage in the recent weeks but it is an artificial shortage because we are not trying to restructure the distribution and retail sector– it used to be a forest where nobody knew who was who, whose income was what, and so on. So we are requiring everybody to have a tax identification number, like the social security number. And most of our businessmen don’t like it. So it is a difficult task.

Eritrea, Ethiopia & Egypt

8. Ethiopian Egyptian relationship has been deceiving on the surface because, deep inside, both countries were mutually suspicious of each other—two major issues have been the Eritrean revolution and, hydropolitcs: the Nile water. You have now embarked on an ambitious power generating (not irrigation) project and it is making the Egyptians uneasy. You said that the projects would protect both Egypt and Sudan (in fact you said they should partially fund the projects). If that is the case, how do you explain the Egyptian reaction? Or is it the Egyptian wish to keep the 1929 agreement intact? Why would they object to Ethiopia generating power from the Nile?

You know the advantage of being in my position is you get to access information that is not necessarily publicly available. And the first thing that I learned that these Nile issues, debate on distribution of The Nile issue, was really a bogus issue. It was really a bogus issue because if you were to treat the Nile basin–and the most sensitive part of the Nile basin is the so-called eastern Nile, the Nile that goes from Ethiopia to Sudan and Egypt– because 85% of the water that goes to Aswan comes from Ethiopia. This part of the water, Nile, which is supposed to have shortage of water, doesn’t have shortage of water; it only has shortage of money. Ethiopia is structured to be the power generating center of the Nile, geographically. Sudan is, geographically, created to be the main agricultural producer of this region. Only the delta part of Egypt is supposed to produce goods, agricultural goods. And so if you use the Nile water in a rational manner, there will not be any shortage of water. The fact is, for example, that if you built dams in Ethiopia and removed Jebel Awliya from Sudan, it is useless; it generates 17 mega watts of electricity but exposes Nile water to evaporation in unheard of proportion. So you don’t need the regulation of Jebel Awliaya because the water would have been regulated here. And reduce the operating level of Aswan Dam, you would have enough water to irrigate more than a million hectares in Ethiopia; and 4 to 5 billion cubic meters of additional water for the Sudan, and Sudan can use the water better than anybody else. The Egyptians themselves have a water conservation project which will end in 2017. And their plan is to save 8 billion cubic meters of additional water. Now, unless they want to take this water and let it evaporate in the desert, they don’t have land that requires 8 billion cubic meter of water. So it is not really about water, it is about politics and power.

The problem, as I see it, is the politics of the Egyptian elite: there is a bit of racism behind it, and there is a bit of colonial inheritance behind it. Colonial clerks tend to be more colonially inclined in their attitudes than their masters and the Egyptians have been, to some extent, clerks of British colonialism in Sudan. And so they inherited this British theory of the Nile serving Liverpool via Egypt. Egypt growing cotton for Liverpool. And finally, the Nile has been this drug that has been used to hook the Egyptian people for external enemies and justify this gargantuan state, Egyptian state which is there to protect the Egyptians vis-a-vis the Abd from the South. So it has been a political instrument more than anything else. And the fact that the Egyptian edifice is beginning to crack now, is allowing alternative opinions amongst Egyptians to creep through the cracks… and these opinions are: why should we quarrel over some natural resource that belongs to us, let’s see if there is a rational win-win alternative…this is unheard of, but it is beginning to creep even into the Egyptian media, so I am very encouraged by it.

9.  Do you intend to develop irrigation projects using the Nile in the future? And how would you balance the natural rights of lower Nile countries and your country’s right to exploit the Nile water resources?

The fact is that the Egyptians could sustain this irrational policy for a number of reasons. First, the geopolitical position was such that they could prevent Ethiopia from accessing grants, loans and credits for projects on the Nile. They have completely shut off our access to credit whether it is from World Bank, or Brazil or China or Europe or the USA.  And so they were assured, given the poverty level in Ethiopia, that Ethiopia will not be investing anything on the Nile, of substance. That was the key instrument. The other instrument they had was that Ethiopia itself was unstable and was not going to focus on development and it was surrounded by hostile government. That is why [Gemal Abdel] Nasser went out of his way to recruit non-Arabs into the Arab League simply because they were in close proximity to Ethiopia—Somalia is a case in point. Now we have reached a stage where some of these assumptions are no longer valid. We are now able to do something significant. We first started with minor projects on the Tekeze [River], Lake Tana. Now we are in a position to be able to finance, on our own, the biggest dam that can be built on the Nile, in Ethiopia. We believe that this is going to dismantle much illusion amongst the Egyptians. We believe that this is going to convince them that they cannot stop us. We believe that this is going to convince them that they do not need to stop us because we are doing their job. The dams we build, we are unable to use 100% of their service, because much of the service is downstream-inevitably, unavoidably. So we will show them in practice, that where we build dams, these are not intended against them. In fact, these are dams that they ought to finance, at least partly, because they will benefit from them. So once we break this taboo, I believe the path will be opened for a rational engagement between ourselves and the Egyptians. By the way, on balance, the Sudanese have taken a rational position on the Nile. On the surface they seem to be twins on their positions on the Nile; that is far from the truth.

10.  Eritrea is considered a Nile basin country, what is the strategic leverage that Eritrea has to influence Nile politics?

Eritrea is a marginal player on the Nile; it is part of the Nile riparian countries primarily because of the Tekeze River. As you know the Tekeze River or the Atbara River in the Sudan carries about 9 million cubic meter of water. There are one or two minor rivers from Eritrea that flow to the Tekeze and maybe contribute about 0.1% or so of the Tekeze which is itself part of the Nile basin. Every stream counts. That is why, technically, Eritrea is a riparian country but it is not in the meetings of the ten riparian countries of the Nile. This is not by design but because your president is not infatuated with international organizations of any sort.

11.  Ok. Now, he has never been my president…sorry for the correction Mr. Prime Minister….The head of the Eritrean regime had close relations and coordination with Egypt on Somalis’ and Sudanese politics. He also had good relations with Gaddafi and benefited from him financially. Now, Mubarek is gone and Gaddafi is on the edge of the cliff. How do you think this would affect the Eritrean regime and how would that effect the stalemate between Eritrea and Ethiopia?

The thing is that Isaias needed the support from these parties, to do not just their bidding, but his own internal drive. So this was a marriage of convenience. This was not Egypt and Kaddafi hiring out Isaias. These [are] two groups coming together on the basis of a common agenda. Egypt providing some of the diplomatic clout, some of the training and assistance; Kaddafi providing the finance and Qatar also providing the finance. Now, what the current environment suggests is that this external support is no longer available. But that doesn’t mean Isaias is going to change his color; he will seek alternative sources of financing—and by the looks of it, he is likely to look at possible mining resources within Eritrea to fill in the gaps that will be left by the discontinuation of support from abroad.

12.  According to the Eritrean regime, your government is on the verge of collapse and they mention defections and military operations by your opponents in North Ethiopia. How true is this?

According to the Eritrean regime, we have been on the verge of collapse, for what…ten years now! And these ten years happen to be, in the eyes of a neutral observer, the golden years of Ethiopia. We have been growing at a double digit rate for seven, eight years now. The country is stable from end to end. Obviously we have our own challenges; we are still a very poor country. Seven years of growth does not mean much when you start from the bottom of the heap. But there is clearly light at the end of the tunnel and it is visible to every Ethiopian. And you don’t have to come to Addis to see it; you could see it in Washington. Ten years ago, none of the meetings that we would call for would be attended by any significant number of people. The other day, in spite of massive campaign by the Diaspora opposition and the Eritrean regime, we had thousands upon thousands of Ethiopians attending our meeting and deciding to buy bonds for the construction of the dam on the Nile. So, it is a very stable government and that is what every major country that has interest in the region would tell you. I think this [claim of imminent demise] is how they keep the illusion of succeeding in their agenda of regime change in Ethiopia.

13.  After the last election and after forming a new government, observers believe that the old guards [of the Ethiopian ruling party] were unceremoniously distanced from the center and new blood occupied their positions. This is said to have caused a rift between you and some of your colleagues. How true is this?

It started out with my declaration that the last term would be my last term. In some ways, that was my public declaration of that intention and it was contradictory to normal party procedures. Because it has not been sanctioned by party debate; I didn’t do that by accident but it was, nevertheless, not within the rules of the party. So it pressed a debate on succession and carried out studies and we saw experiences of other countries and, in the end, leadership came to a conclusion that there should be an organized, gradual withdrawal of the leaders of the armed struggle. And the best way to withdraw is while the going is good, while that leadership is still alive and able to influence policies from behind. So, at that stage this was the consensus position. Now, who goes first and who goes later—there was some debate but it was mostly focused on when I leave, when I depart. And then it was agreed that I will depart at the end of this term. And that would be my departure and the team that departs with me would be the last one. That is why everybody has to depart between the beginning of this term and the end of this term. So it was a consensus position and there has not been any of those that have been retired. They are not unemployed—some of them are ambassadors, some of them are training our leadership, some of them are working in public enterprise and so on and so forth. So there are no complaints.

14.  Last year, you signed an agreement with the Ogaden groups and they even participated in the elections and are part of the local government.  Are they in the federal government? If you could describe for me where that agreement that reached… what was achieved and what was not, maybe sticking points if there are any?

Yes we signed agreements with two groups—one was an Islamist group, an offshoot of Al-Itihad Al-Islami group. Their agenda, their decision was to get out of politics and integrate into society, do business and so on and so forth. That has been completed. And then we had an agreement with one group, one faction of the ONLF, again the agreement was a process of integration domestically and for them to try to win over the rest of the ONLF particularly in the Diaspora. So I believe the program and the agreements are being implemented quite well.

15.  Are they in the federal government?

Yes

16.  Now you have South Sudan as an additional country that borders Ethiopia. As if how Sudan would have close relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea is not confusing enough, South Sudan has close relations with both Eritrea and Ethiopia. Can you tell me how that is possible when there are so many interconnected crisis in the region?

The assumption is wrong. South Sudan is not in good terms with Eritrea. Before South Sudan is born, Eritrea is beginning to destabilize South Sudan. Those in the know in the region, they know among other things the Eritrean regime is beginning to arm a militia group led by a certain gentleman known as George Attol.  I am told by reliable sources that the Southern Sudanese went to Asmara to plead with the president not to destabilize southern Sudan, and I am told that the response they got is a surprised stare—which is typical of the Eritrean regime: they never admit what they are doing. So, the relationship between South Sudan and Eritrea is typical of Eritrea’s relations with everybody in the neighborhood.

17.  I heard from some sources that a leader of Southern Sudan is apprehensive that Ethiopia has relations with the Eritrean national opposition because he considers them Muslims and Arab influenced. First, is this true? If yes, what was your response? Why would a new country adopt such a bigoted position?

The assumption is wrong again. Silva [kir, the leader of South Sudan] never, ever, asked me to, in anyway, affect my policy on Eritrea. Not just with the opposition, but also with the regime. He never raised any of this issue, at all. Naturally he didn’t, at all, raise the issue of who we are supporting or nor supporting section of the Eritrean opposition…I don’t think he draws all that conclusion of  Eritrea.

I have heard and seen articles in the Eritrean opposition website about what Eritrea could teach southern Sudan and that and the other. I think this is largely ill-informed. First of all, southern Sudan currently has no business with Eritrea, they have no borders, and they have no economic interaction. Ten years ago, they needed Eritrea because they needed arms; now, if they need arms, they buy them; they can’t get them from Eritrea. So the only interest for Isaias in southern Sudan is that there is a significant Eritrean Diaspora in southern Sudan and they are doing well, business wise. And the regime is trying to suck money out of them like it does everywhere else.

18.  You have Libyan investment in Ethiopia. One of them is Libyaoil: Is it true that Libyaoil is owned by one of Kadaddfi’s sons? If that is true, wouldn’t [it] be a gesture for Ethiopia to hand over the assets to the transitional Libyan administration? How about the Libyan embassy in Ethiopia—what is its position, still with Gaddafi? And how much of your oil comes from Libya and how has the supply been affected?

I understand the embassy, at least formally, is siding with Kaddafi. The Libyan government has bought off Shell Ethiopia and it is now OilLibya. That is the only investment I know of the Libyan government or Kaddafi—it is very difficult to distinguish between the Libyan government and Kaddafi. I don’t know where Gaddafi private starts or where the Libyan government property ends. Now, the way we operate here in Ethiopia is to follow first international law—Security Council has said this property is sanction on Libya that applies to Ethiopia.  Secondly, there is AU—sometimes we agree within them sometimes we do not agree with them. But even when we do not agree with them, we do not believe in publicly second guessing them. This, we think, is part of the due that we have to pay for the fact that we host the AU. So at this stage we have not recognized the national council in Benghazi, we wait for the AU to do so. Even in the case of, for example, Somaliland where we engage with the authorities like a sovereign authority, in everything except name. We refrained from recognizing them, and we have told the Somaliland authorities, they have got to get the African Union supporting them before we can recognize them. Again, in the case of [Alassana] Ouattara, in Ivory Coast. He is the internationally recognized president and he wanted to change his embassy here and we recognize him like the AU he is the internationally recognized leader, but we asked the AU if they would give us clearance, because he will also be the ambassador not only to Ethiopia but also to the AU. The AU told us to hold up for a moment, hopefully now they will give us a clearance. The way we operate here is such that we don’t take initiatives in recognizing states especially in Africa.

19.  Over the last few weeks, you made statements regarding Eritrea and there were also statements from the Ethiopian ministry of foreign affairs. Is anything extraordinary happening at the border area, troop movements, preparation for an attack…or anything of that nature?

It is not so much about a tense border situation; it is about the fact that we have reached a stage where our previous policy of passive defense does not work, it cannot work anymore. In the past, our policy was to try and follow the terrorists that Isaias was sending across the border and try neutralizing them rather than responding at the source. That was fine for two reasons: first their target ground opposition and terrorism was government and government institutions, specifically, military and security establishment and other government entities.  These are what they call “hard targets”, you can harden them and protect them. You can never be 100% fullproof. If some terrorist slips through a crack you can take it from there and move on because these are government targets. In recent months, the target has been shifted. The recent crop of terrorists that Isaias sent across the border were targeting things such as Fil-Waha [hot springs in Addis, which is a tourist destination] , Mercato [shopping district], taxis, buses—these are what they call “soft targets”. The instructions that they were given when they were being trained around Asseb in Dankalia region, was to change Addis into Baghdad.  Now, when you have such soft target, the only way you can protect the soft targets is at the source. So, we now have to tell the Eritrean regime, if you carry outrageous acts in Ethiopia, not only the terrorists that you send, but you yourself, you are going to pay. And our response is going to be proportional. As I was saying in parliament the other day, if they shoot a bullet at us, we shoot a bullet back at them. If this forces them to stop the destabilization activity, all the better for everybody. If they maintain the current state of undeclared war and do not escalate it, we will maintain a response that is appropriate to it, we will not escalate it. If they escalate it to a war and a full scale invasion of Ethiopia,  we will do what we always said we will do in the past because this will be a second certified invasion of Ethiopia where the proportionate response to it would be to make sure that there would not be a third one. So there is a shift in direction, it doesn’t automatically mean that there is going to be war –it all depends on how Isaias responds.  [If it is] by escalation and invasion of Ethiopia, then we will have war. If he responds by de-escalating, then there won’t be one.

Djibouti, Eritrea & Ethiopia

20.  Last week I was in Djibouti and I visited the port facilities, the container storage, car storage, oil tank farms and dry cargo facilities. I also visited Bilbela, a town that seems to thrive on business from the Ethiopian drivers and the general Ethiopia-Djibouti business and the transport trucks that pass through it. I also saw thousands of Ethiopian trucks in that area. My question is: how much business is Djibouti getting from Eritrea? And if what happened ten years ago didn’t happen, how much of that business do you estimate would have been the share of Eritrean ports? And, if the political situation in Eritrea changed and there was a liberal, business friendly government there, how much of this do you think Eritrea would regain…I mean, including Massawa, which is more convenient to the northern part of Ethiopia.

Quite a lot. The current prospects in Ethiopia now are such that even if we had Eritrean ports as key ports, we will still be needing Djibouti. So, while we have not given up on the hope of normalization between these two countries, Eritrea and Ethiopia, nevertheless, we are convinced that even with normalization, Asseb and Massawa, and a few other ports like Tio, will just not be enough. So we are investing heavily in Djibouti. We are going to build a new railway from Addis to Djibouti. We are going to build a new railway system from the north to Tajura—a new port will be built in Tajura [old Djibouti port]. In the short run, all of that business, 80% of that business would have gone to Asseb and a small percentage would have gone to Massawa, but now it is completely diverted to Djibouti.

21.  Can you give me some figures, the value of this business?

I do not have exact figures at hand, but I will be surprised if the net income of Djibouti were to be less than half a billion dollar or so.

22.  Do you think that this business is lost forever by the Eritrean ports or Eritrea would be able to regain these lost opportunities under normal situation?

It is going to regain it precisely because the demand of the Ethiopian economy is going to go beyond the capacity of Tajura and Djibouti to take care of the requirements of Ethiopia. For example we are beginning to develop the potassium resources in the Afar region of Ethiopia—that is millions of tons per year that needs to be transported. Technically, the closest port to this is not even Asseb, it is Tio. You could develop it into a big port. So under normal situation, Eritrea could regain most of these businesses and develop new businesses as well.

Saturday, April 30, 2011

Egypt plans a new relation with Ethiopia that ensures a win win approach


April 28, 2011 (WIC) ­ - The Embassy of Egypt in Ethiopia disclosed that Egypt plans to begin a new approach to strengthen its relations with Ethiopia that could ensure a win win solution.

In his exclusive interview with WIC, Egyptian Ambassador in Ethiopia, Tarek Ghoneim said Egypt needs to begin a new chapter of relations with Ethiopia based on mutual benefits and common understanding.

“Let’s not look at the past. We need to turn the new page or chapter for a bright future of the people of Ethiopia and Egypt,” ambassador Ghoneim said.

The new government in Egypt planned to have a dialogue with Ethiopian officials and will sign the agreement if a win win solution is reached.

The ambassador also said that Egypt will collaborate to Ethiopia’s development efforts.

“There is no need to look back to the past rather it would be essential for the two countries to have a dialogue and start a new chapter of relations so that they could be benefited from the projects here in Ethiopia and in Egypt.

“In the next few years, the two countries will build positive and constructive relations with the good will and wise leadership of the two countries,” the ambassador said, adding that there is a big room for them to ensure developments with direct impacts on the people of Ethiopia and Egypt.

“We need to move into the future and need to look into a new phase of relations that could promote our development forgetting the past misconceptions,’ the ambassador said.

Regarding some reports about Egypt’s effort to force interference, he said that Egypt is a peace loving country that the reports by some irresponsible media and groups from both sides are groundless. He also added that Egypt never want to have that kind of conflict with Ethiopia.

The ambassador also said as Ethiopia contributes much of the water, Egypt wants Ethiopia to use the water to alleviate its poverty.

It will be cheaper for Egypt and other countries to buy electricity from Ethiopia, ambassador Tarek said, adding that Egypt will support Ethiopia’s move towards development

International law on trans-boundary River reaffirms Ethiopia’s stand

Amir Abdullah International law on trans-boundary River reaffirms Ethiopia’s stand
Wednesday, 27 April 2011

Addis Ababa, April 27 (WIC) – International law on the use of trans-boundary rivers very well supports Ethiopia’s stand, a high level legal and diplomatic expert said.

Ambassador Hailu W. Giorgis, who served as legal advisor in the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) and as state minister and head of African Unity Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), said that all riparian countries have the right to utilize water that flows through their territory without jeopardizing the water security of the countries downstream.

“The 1997 ruling of the International Court of Justice to resolve the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia supports Ethiopia’s stand on the use of the Nile River,” Ambassador Hailu told WIC in an exclusive interview.

In 1977 Hungary and Czechoslovakia concluded Treaty which provided for the construction of a major hydroelectric dam project on the Danube as a "joint investment". The case was taken to the ICJ when Hungary subsequently abandoned its part of the Project.

The Court, which found both parties as breaching their agreement, held that Hungary was not entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon the works and Czechoslovakia was entitled to proceed to the "provisional solution" which included damming the river at a different location. The Court also called on both states to negotiate in good faith and take all necessary measures in order to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the 1977 Budapest Treaty.

“All over the world including Africa international rivers are utilized with cooperation between riparian countries,” Ambassador Hailu said. “It is only the Nile River which was denied of such cooperation for a long time”.

After years of negotiations, the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) for equitable utilization of the Nile River was opened for signature last year. It has so far been signed by six of the riparian countries and awaits ratification in their domestic law.

“The utilization of the Nile River should no longer be presented as an issue of Egypt and Ethiopia only,” the Ambassador said. “Now, it also concerns the riparian countries who expressed their position by signing the agreement”.

Ambassador Hailu, who wrote a book (le abay wuha mugit) which deals with Ethiopia’s legal right to utilize the Nile River, finally urged the country to intensify its diplomatic efforts to shape the minds of ordinary Egyptians and the rest of the international community as to the benefits of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance dam which is being built on the Nile River.

President Obama Strategy. By Ryan Lizza, New Yorker

Friday, April 29, 2011

Embassy to host “Yes You (th) Can!” conference




Friday, 29 April 2011

Addis Ababa, April 29 (WIC) - The Embassy of the United States of America, in collaboration with the Addis Ababa Bureau of education, on Saturday will hold an all-day conference on volunteerism, community service and leadership for approximately 600 youth from Addis Ababa preparatory schools.

The conference, to be held under the theme: “Yes You (th) Can!”, will bring together 11th and 12th grade students from Addis Ababa to discuss the opportunities Ethiopian students have to be contributors and leaders in serving their schools, communities and country and world.

According to a statement the US Embassy sent to WIC today, environmental conservation and sustainability will be emphasized as areas in which youth have a particular stake and the ability to make a difference.

Guests expected to speak at the event include Addis Ababa Bureau of Education Head Dilamo Otore and U.S Deputy Chief of Mission Dr. Tulinabo Mushingi.
Eritrea Calls Ethiopia’s New Stance a ‘Declaration of War’
By William Davison - Apr 29, 2011 8:17 AM ET

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Eritrea criticized Ethiopia’s new stance on relations between the two countries as “pure aggression and a declaration of war” and denied it supports terrorism.

Ethiopia’s government on April 15 announced it will increase support to Eritrean rebels seeking to overthrow the government of President Isaias Afewerki. The country will use “any means at its disposal” to bring about regime change unless the Eritrean government changes its policies, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry said.

The two countries fought a 1998-2000 border war that killed 70,000 people, according to Brussels-based International Crisis Group. Relations between the two have remained tense as each backed opposing factions in nearby Somalia’s civil war. Skirmishes between Ethiopian and Eritrean troops occasionally break out along their 912-kilometer (567-mile) border. Ethiopia previously accused Eritrea of supporting Ethiopian rebels and al-Qaeda-linked insurgents in neighboring Somalia.

“Eritrea does not have an agenda of destabilizing Ethiopia or the region,” Girma Asmerom, Eritrea’s ambassador to the African Union, said to the 53-member continental bloc’s security panel on April 26.

Accusations of Eritrean support for terrorism are “fabricated and baseless,” he said. “It is not in our psyche, our culture, our philosophy, our upbringing, our value and our history to attack civilian targets, victimize and terrorize innocent people.”

Bombing Attempt

In February, Ethiopia said it foiled an attempt by the rebel Oromo Liberation Front to bomb an AU summit in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of backing the front.

Eritrea’s “destabilization activities against other countries in the region, including Ethiopia, continue unabated,” the Foreign Ministry said.

Eritrea has been under United Nations sanctions since December 2009 for its alleged support of terrorists fighting to topple the Western-backed government of Somalia. Eritrea’s Foreign Ministry says the sanctions are “unjustifiable.”

The international community should condemn the aggression by the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government and call for its withdrawal from Eritrean territory, Girma said.

Isaias and Meles led allied rebel groups that overthrew Ethiopia’s Communist Derg regime in 1991. Eritrea, formerly an Ethiopian province, won independence after a 1993 referendum. A 2002 decision by a United Nations commission that the disputed town of Badme is Eritrean has been rejected by Ethiopia.

“Eritrea is ready to normalize relations with Ethiopia” if Ethiopia vacates its territory, Girma said.

To contact the reporter on this story: William Davison in Addis Ababa via Nairobi at pmrichardson@bloomberg.net.
Addis Ababa, April 29, 2011 (Addis Ababa) - The House of Peoples' Representatives said Mass Media and Freedom of Information has been maintained in the country.
Speaking at the opening of a relevant awareness raising forum organized for parliamentarians here on Friday, Culture, Tourism and Mass Media Affairs Standing Committee Chairperson of the House, Rabia Essa said the constitution has ensured freedom of speech and expression of citizens.

The constitution has fully brought to an end the practice censorship, which she said helped to ensure freedom of mass media.

Rabia said the government has been undertaking various activities including preparation of relevant proclamations to implement freedom of speech and expression ensured in the constitution.

The Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation as well as broadcasting proclamation are some of the major activities carried out by the government towards the same goal.

The Chairperson said the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority has been undertaking encouraging activities towards development of the mass media.

Realization of community radio in the country is one of the major activities carried out by the authority, she said, and stressed the need to give prime attention to expansion of community radio as most of the people live in rural parts of the country.

The day-long forum , organized by the Authority, discussed on concept of community radio, legal frameworks of mass media and importance of community radio, among others.
Addis Ababa, April 29, 2011 (Addis Ababa) - Egyptian public diplomatic delegation consisting of 38 members drawn from various sectors of the society arrived here on Friday for a four-day visit.
The delegation is expected to confer with higher level officials of the country on issues related to the equitable utilization of River Nile.

Delegation Coordinator, Mustafa El-Gundy said former Egyptian leaders ignored the necessity to create diplomatic relation with other African nations.

He said the new Egyptian administration is desirous to strengthen the relation with African countries.

Mustafa said all the Nile riparian countries have the right to develop and exploit the river equitably and expressed belief that the Nile riparian countries need to work together to develop the river and ensure equal utilization.

Most of the Egyptians do not accept the 1929 and 1959 agreement signed between Egypt, Sudan and Britain over the river Nile.

Wafd Party President, Dr. Sayd El-Badawi on his part said the aim of the visit is to re-establish the people-to-people relation between the two countries.

He said the Egyptian people support Ethiopia's efforts to develop and exploit the Nile.

Member of Youth Coalition of the Egyptian Revolution, Dr. Sally Moore said the Mubarak administration separated Egypt from other African countries.

According to her, the aim of the visit is to display Egypt's commitment to re-establish and strengthen the diplomatic ties with the African countries.

Majority of the youth, who participated in the revolution to overthrow Mubarak, support Ethiopia's right to develop and exploit the river, she said.

Son of the late President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Hakim Abdel-Nasser on his part said the delegation is here to discuss with Ethiopians on the equal utilization of the Nile.

The visit will also strengthen the people to people relation between the two countries, he said.

According to Ethiopian Ambassador to Egypt, Mohamoud Dirir

, the delegation consists of the three presidential candidates, community leaders, judges, former MPs, youth representatives, among others.

The delegation will meet with President Girma Woldegiorgis, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ethiopian Orthodox Church Patriarch, Abune Paulos as well as Speakers of the House of Peoples' Representatives and also the House of Federation.

T:1:20-2:00PM

E:3:20-3:25PM

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Wednesday, September 10, 2008

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF

Aregawi Berhe is a research associate at the Afrika Studiecentrum, Leiden, the Netherlands.
He is grateful for the comments of Jon G. Abbink as well as those of an anonymous referee.
1. Former senior TPLF members Giday Zera-tsion, Kahsai Berhe and the present author
have written critical articles on their differences with the TPLF leadership after they broke with
the organization. Though valuable documents, they were not published and remain in private
hands.
2. Solomon Gashaw, ‘Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia’, in Crawford Young (ed.),
The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The nation-state at bay (University of Wisconsin Press,
Madison, WI, 1993), p. 156.
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION FRONT
A
REGAWI
B
ERHE
ABSTRACT
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), at its inception, was
grounded in an ethno-nationalist consciousness generated by the cumula-
tive grievances of Tigrayans against successive central governments of
Ethiopia. An association of Tigrayan elites, the urban-based Tigrayan
National Organization (TNO), prepared the groundwork for the for-
mation of the TPLF. The TPLF, for its part, utilized class and ethno-
nationalist ideologies to mobilize Tigrayans until it ousted the Mengistu
government in 1991. This article analyzes how this ethno-nationalist
organization emerged, grew and finally came to dominate Ethiopia — a
state with an emerging multi-national character.
L
ITTLE HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE
T
IGRAY
P
EOPLE
’
S
L
IBERATION
F
RONT
(TPLF). Even less has been written by any author with
inside knowledge.
1
As a founding member of the TPLF, who was part of
its leadership for eleven years, I believe I have something relevant to share
on this subject with anyone interested in contemporary political develop-
ments in Ethiopia.
The TPLF started in February 1975 as a small guerrilla band in the
northern region of Ethiopia and eventually grew to provide the core of the
Ethiopian government. It was originally an ethno-nationalist movement
that aimed to secure the self-determination of Tigray within the Ethiopian
polity. It succeeded in mobilizing the people of Tigray to such extraordi-
nary effect that, in 1991, it won state power in Ethiopia in the name of the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The latter
— the government of Ethiopia today — is often accused by opponents of
being ‘simply a Tigrean front’.
2
During an armed struggle that lasted for
16 years, the TPLF mobilized Tigrayans behind the front and created a
569
African Affairs (2004), 103/413, 569–592
© Royal African Society 2004
DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adh024
________________________________________
Page 2
large and disciplined army that defeated not only rival liberation fronts but
also the military government itself, one of the strongest in Africa.
The historical roots of the problem
The recorded history of Ethiopia as a state has its origins in the third
century
AD
in the present Tigray region, then known as the kingdom of
Aksum. The Aksumites developed their own civilization as illustrated by
their script, Ge’ez, their number system, Kutir, and their calendar, Awde-
Awarih, which are still in use at the present time. In
AD
340, the Aksumite
king Abraha (Ezana) adopted Orthodox Christianity,which quickly became
the religion of the inhabitants of the region and provided the symbolism
and substance of the royal ideology. With Aksum as a pivot, an empire
expanded over the Ethiopian highlands. Present-day Tigrayans who are
situated at the centre of this ancient civilization have indeed something to
be proud of.
The Aksumite civilization, however, did not last longer than the seventh
century. The gradual loss of dynamism of the centralized state in turn gave
rise over the centuries to the emergence of local kings and princes, often
entangled in endless wars for supremacy. By the nineteenth century,
northern Ethiopia (Tigray and present-day Eritrea) was divided into no less
than twenty-four independent units, according to the writer Zewde Gabre
Selassie,
3
and contained many more firearms than any other region in the
country. During the period 1830 to 1850, Gabre Selassie notes, there were
28,000 matchlock guns in Tigray, while Begemidir, Shoa, and Wollo had
4,000, 1,000 and 1,000 respectively.
4
Firearms became abundant in Tigray
partly because it was so often the gateway for incursions by foreign invaders.
The period of anarchy from 1760 to 1855, which totally undermined the
Ethiopian state, was known as the Zemene Mesafint (‘Era of Princes’). At
that time, war became a common occurrence and the gun a highly prized
asset, particularly in Tigray, competing with the tradition that had persisted
for centuries of resolving conflicts by peaceful means through religious
leaders and shimagiles,groups of notables and influential elders who mediate
parties in conflict. In most cases they preside on their own initiative but are
sometimes invited to do so.
Amid this anarchy, Kassa Hailu, a rebel from Gondar, succeeded in
becoming emperor, taking the name of Emperor Tewodros (1855–68) after
defeating all the local kings and princes or rases. He managed at last to res-
urrect in Ethiopia the semblance of a unitary state based on the Aksumite
570
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
3. Zewde Gabre Sellassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: A political biography (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1975), pp. 2–3.
4. Ibid., p. 19.
________________________________________
Page 3
religious ideology. Kahsay Mircha, a rebel from Tigray, succeeded Tewodros
as Emperor Yohannes (1872–89), and was crowned in Aksum. Despite their
success in re-establishing the Ethiopian state, the reigns of these two
emperors were never stable or peaceful, due to both internal conflicts and
external invasions. Locally, lords who aspired to power were likely to rebel
whenever conditions were favourable. There were countless local wars both
between regional chiefs but also, more intensely, to resist the emergence of
Kassa Hailu and later Kahsay Mircha as Emperors Tewodros and
Yohannes. Also, external forces, including Britain in 1868, Egypt in
1875–76, Sudanese Mahdists in 1889, and Italy in 1887–96 and 1935,were
responsible for a series of incursions that made the defence of the country
the main preoccupation of the rulers and the people, thereby making stable
life almost impossible. Tigrayans, living in the gateway to Ethiopia, carried
the greatest burdens of war.
On top of these wars, famine was taking its toll, dislodging the working
population and dismantling the fabric of the society that had been built up
over centuries, beginning with the Aksumite civilization.The peasant popu-
lation was constantly forced to side with one or the other warlord in their
battles and to feed their predatory armies. The spiralling combination of
foreign assaults, local wars and deadly famines left Tigray in utter destitu-
tion. As John Young observed, ‘In the period between the death of
Yohannes in 1889 and the present day an estimated seventeen famines have
struck Tigray, the biggest being in 1958–9, 1965–6, 1972–4, and 1983–4’.
5
During these periods millions of people died and still more were displaced
from their homes.
Subsequent leaders of Ethiopia — Emperors Menelik II (1889–1913)
and Haile Selassie I (1930–74) — were not concerned to address or attempt
to mitigate the dismal state of Tigray, but both fought extensive wars in this
Ethiopian gateway, notably at the battles of Adwa (1896) and Maichew
(1935) respectively. During Menelik’s reign, Gebrehiwet Baykedagne, a
political economist of the time, wrote:
. . . there are hardly any Tigrayan youth left in their birthplace, Tigray. Like a swarm
of bees without their queen, they are aimlessly scattered in four corners of the earth.
Some people ridiculed their widespread poverty. Unfortunately, whilst other people
live in tranquillity, Tigray has never been free from wars, leave alone outlaws and
bandits.
6
This situation seemed to have no end. While regions adjacent to Tigray
were also substantially affected by these calamities, the southern part of
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
’
S LIBERATION FRONT
571
5. John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia:The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975–1991
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 49.
6. Gebre-Hiwet Baykedagne, Emperor Menelik and Ethiopia (Swedish Mission, Asmara,
1912), p. 12.
________________________________________
Page 4
Ethiopia was relatively stable and gave sanctuary to the fleeing Tigrayans,
but also gave them derogatory names.
When in 1942–43 peasants in central and southern Tigray began to rebel
out of desperation, they were met with a harsh response. Haile Selassie’s
government in collaboration with the British Royal Air Force (RAF), after
dropping warning leaflets addressed to ‘the Chiefs, Balabats — people of
Tigre province’ on 6 October 1943, devastated the region including
Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, throughout the rest of that month. This
quelled the Tigrayan peasant uprising, known as Woyane, meaning ‘revolt’.
7
Thousands of defenceless civilians lost their lives as a result of aerial bom-
bardment. It is recorded that ‘on 14th October [1943] 54 bombs dropped
in Mekelle, 6th October 14 bombs followed by another 16 bombs on 9th
October in Hintalo, 7th/9th October 32 bombs in Corbetta’.
8
Repression
did not stop there. The people of Tigray region were forced to pay large
sums of money and their land was confiscated and distributed to loyal
gentry as a punishment and as a deterrent to future revolt. A new taxation
system was imposed that ‘cost the peasants five times more than they had
paid under the Italians’.
9
In the name of centralization, Haile Selassie took
away regional power from hereditary leaders and gave it to loyal Showan
administrators.
10
This predicament again raised the level of collective
resentment, taking the form of ethno-nationalist sentiment against the
Showan ruling class at the centre. As Gilkes rightly observed, ‘indepen-
dence from Shoan (sic) rule was raised as a rallying cry and proved
popular’.
11
The punitive measures of the central government, and
especially the memory of the RAF bombardment of Mekelle on behalf of
Haile Selassie’s government, became grievances rooted in popular memory.
British administrators in Eritrea in the late 1940s had a strategic interest
in supporting the popular call of Tigrayans that their hereditary leaders
should rule their region, thereby creating a growing awareness of Tigrayan
nationalism. Moreover, ‘Before the British the Italians had already
advanced this policy in what they named politica tigrina’.
12
Ras Mengesha
Seyoum, the last hereditary governor of Tigray, made some attempts to
572
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
7. On the Woyane, see Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia, Power and Protest: Peasant revolts in the 20th
century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991); Patrick Gilkes, The Dying Lion:
Feudalism and modernisation in Ethiopia (Julian Friedman Publishers, London, 1975); John
Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Zed Books, Atlantic Heights, NJ,
1990).
8. Gilkes, The Dying Lion, p. 180.
9. Haggai Erlich, ‘Tigrean nationalism, British involvement and Haila-Sellasie’s emerging
absolutism — northern Ethiopia, 1941–1943’, Asian and African Studies 15, 2 (1981), p. 219.
10. Showa is a region from which the Amharic-speaking ruling elite of Ethiopia, who
monopolized top political and administrative positions, came. This class of Showans governed
the rest of Ethiopia from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the period of consolidation
of the Ethiopian empire.
11. Gilkes, The Dying Lion, p. 187.
12. Erlich, ‘Tigrean nationalism’, p. 195.
________________________________________
Page 5
introduce industry to the region, but without success. Tigrayans were
obliged to migrate to the former Italian colony, Eritrea, or to Addis Ababa
and other cities in southern Ethiopia in search of work, as conditions were
relatively better there. But at the same time it earned them a number of
derogatory names that wounded their pride. Tigrayans’ mobility was sar-
castically compared to that of a Land Rover jeep, to describe how they
roamed over large areas of the country. It was said that Tigray was con-
demned to ‘growing rocks’ instead of grain. Generations of Tigrayans grew
up with deep feelings of desperation.The neglect of Tigray in the 1900s up
to the revolution of 1975 was generally perceived by them as a deliberate
and systematic policy of the Showa-Amhara ruling class in order to weaken
and demoralize the Tigrayans. This view was a reflection of the historical
rivalry of the two ruling houses and the Tigrayan and Amhara aristocratic
classes; it should be emphasized that, as Hizkias Assefa rightly puts it, ‘this
situation does not mean that the great majority of the Amhara people have
been “dominators” or beneficiaries of the political, economic or social
system that bore their name’.
13
These were all factors that nurtured Tigrayan ethno-nationalism, includ-
ing a cultural domination reflected in the linguistic disparities within the
empire. In 1972–74, the worst famine on record left more than half the
population of Tigray destitute.The failure of the state to resolve the resent-
ments simmering throughout the country tended in the end to encourage
people to seek a solution in their own localities, producing a series of ethno-
nationalist mobilizations. Thus, not only local grievances but also a general
resentment directed against holders of power at the centre acquired expres-
sion in the form of ethno-nationalism, gradually building up and being
passed on to the next generation. There was gradual erosion of the auth-
ority of the central government, and an increasing number of sporadic
rebellions, locally known as shiftinnet.
14
The end of the empire
For years, then, struggles were taking place in Tigray in various forms
against Emperor Haile Selassie’s monarchical rule. This background
created the conditions for the eventual emergence of the TPLF and its
rapid growth. Legal and illegal political associational activities, strikes,
underground movements, sporadic armed rebellions and even appeals for
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
’
S LIBERATION FRONT
573
13. Hizkias Assefa,‘Ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa: myth and reality’, in K. Rupesinghe
and V. A. Tishkov (eds), Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World (UN University Press,
Tokyo, 1996), p. 35.
14. For a broader understanding of shiftinnet, see Timothy Fernyhough, ‘Social mobility and
dissident elites in northern Ethiopia: the role of banditry, 1900–1969’, in Donald Crummey
(ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa (James Currey, London and Heinemann,
Portsmouth, NH, 1986), pp. 151–72.
________________________________________
Page 6
divine intervention were some of the modes of struggle waged to challenge
the rule of a repressive regime and to mitigate Tigrayans’ misery.
Although such anti-government movements were taking place in other
parts of Ethiopia as well, including armed uprisings in Bale (1963–68),
Gojjam (1967) and Eritrea from 1961, none of them was successful in
toppling the national government. Finally, however, in February 1974, a
spontaneous revolution broke out at the centre of the empire, galvanizing
the entire Ethiopian population and bringing about a dramatic change in a
government that had appeared invincible. Almost without resistance, the
once mighty emperor was overthrown, and the whole monarchical struc-
ture and feudal system collapsed. But it was only to be replaced by a
military dictatorship of the worst type. The subsequent military regime,
which adopted Marxism as its ideology, was even more brutal than the
imperial administration in its dealings with those Ethiopians who aspired to
democracy and justice, and especially so with regard to the Tigrayans and
other marginalized nationalities whose demand was self-determination.
Roughly speaking, this demand for self-determination implied autonomous
administration, a fair distribution of political power, and equal recognition
of culture, language and religion.
Following the February revolution, already by July 1974 political power
was in the hands of the military. The armed forces were better organized
than any other socio-political group in the country because of Ethiopia’s
long-standing military tradition. On 12 September in the same year, the
military junta known as the Derg put Emperor Haile Selassie under house
arrest and officially declared its seizure of power. Colonel Mengistu Haile
Mariam emerged as the leader of a government whose motto was ‘Ethiopia
First’. Its ideology was oriented towards both nationalism and moderniz-
ation, and was thus ‘directed against the weakening of the state by “seces-
sionist” movements’.
15
In this respect, ‘Mengistu’s regime in no time
revealed itself as essentially no different from the previous regime towards
the assertive ethnic-nationalities, only this time accompanied by the harsh-
ness of military dictatorship’.
16
The Derg regarded Ethiopia as a mono-
lithic society, thereby declaring any ethno-nationalist grievance or demand
for self-determination as contrary to Ethiopian unity and interests. Its
superpower ally, the Soviet Union, supported this rigid stand of central-
ization both ideologically and politically. Nationalists who opted for some
sort of regional autonomous rule or self-determination,which by no means
amounted to a demand for secession, were prime targets of the Derg’s
574
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
15. Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (Verso, London, 1981),
p. 29.
16. Aregawi Berhe, ‘Ethiopia: success story or state of chaos?’, in Ronaldo Munck and
Purnaka L. de Silva (eds), Post-modern Insurgencies:Political violence,identity formation and peace-
making in comparative perspective (Macmillan, Basingstoke and St. Martin’s Press, New York,
2000), p. 99.
________________________________________
Page 7
assault. It was during this period of political uncertainty and terror that
many socio-political groups emerged as national and multi-national political
organizations to challenge the dominance of the military.
How the armed struggle began
Throughout the 1950s and ’60s there had been rebels attempting to
create a movement with a broad perspective. In the tradition of Haile
Mariam Reda, who led the Woyane, the Tigrayan peasant revolt of
1942–43, Gessesew Ayele (widely known by his nickname Sihule) was one
person striving hard to create a broad-based rebellion against the govern-
ment. By the same token, the eventual founder of the Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF) that set out to wage an armed struggle in Eritrea in 1961, Idris
Awate, started his career as a shifta or bandit. Gessesew Ayele (Sihule) was
one of several Tigrayans who had contacts with Idris Awate. Many politi-
cally conscious Tigrayans showed sympathy and admiration for the insur-
gents in Eritrea, not because they supported the secessionist agenda that
was gradually taking shape, but out of their resentment against the govern-
ments that left the people of Tigray in misery and despair. Emulating the
Eritrean movement as a courageous challenge, many radical elements had,
since 1970, been forming groups that contemplated an armed struggle to
assert the rights of the Tigrayans for equality and fair treatment. Besides
Sihule, other individuals involved in such arduous challenges included
Amare Tesfu, Tekeste Wubneh, Mussie Kidane, Gebre Meskel Hailu,
Raswork Ketsela, Mulu Tesfay, Atsbaha Hastire and the present author. In
1973, for instance, a group led by Amare Tesfu was on the verge of starting
an armed rebellion in Tigray but was thwarted by a split that occurred at
the last minute concerning the nature of the Eritrean fronts with which a
working relationship was to be established. Amare and Tekeste recom-
mended co-operation with the ELF,while others favoured the rival Eritrean
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).
Initially,when the Showan-Amhara-dominated regime of Emperor Haile
Selassie was overthrown in 1974, it was hoped that a new government would
address the plight of Tigrayans, but such expectations were soon dashed as
the military took full power towards the end of that year. The military
regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam wasted no time in proving to
be the worst enemy of Tigrayan aspirations. Thus, there emerged many
Tigrayan ethno-nationalist groups unwilling to negotiate with such a regime,
but determined to assert their rights through the ‘barrel of the gun’.
17
The
Tigrayan National Organization (TNO), soon to become the TPLF,was only
one of these.The genesis of the TNO will be described in more detail shortly.
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
’
S LIBERATION FRONT
575
17. ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun’ was Mao’s dictum frequently reiter-
ated by the revolutionary generation of the time, ethno-nationalists and multi-nationalists alike.
________________________________________
Page 8
At the same time, there was a growth of other associations that were not
overtly revolutionary in nature. This included student associations. Tigray
had no university or college until the mid-1990s. Indeed, as recently as the
1950s, it had only four high schools, without adequate teachers or facili-
ties, for a population of about 3.5 million people. High school students were
engaged in sporadic movements to protest about the dismal conditions of
their schools and the misery reigning in their region in general. For some
time they had no associational structure to pursue their demands, but with
the collaboration of the last imperial governor of the region, Ras Mengesha
Seyoum, a semi-legal cultural association called Tigray-Bahli was formed
by the efforts of people like Ato Gessesew Ayele,Ato Hagos Alemayehu and
others. In this association hundreds of students and teachers participated
actively to promote their culture and assert their Tigrayan identity. Yet, the
obstacles posed by the central government were so many that the associ-
ation fizzled out in a matter of two to three years.A weekly newspaper called
Semyenawi Kokeb (‘Northern Star’) was also established, but that too did
not last long.
In the Haile Selassie I University (now renamed Addis Ababa Uni-
versity), however, the political atmosphere was, to a certain extent, con-
ducive to students articulating their grievances and coming together to
form associations, but not without cost. Thus, most students from Tigray,
when they went to the university, saw it as part of their student life to
participate actively in protests that called for change either at national or
regional level. This was why many university students from Tigray played
such a prominent role in the struggle against Haile Selassie’s feudal regime.
Their aim was not the restoration of Tigrayan hegemony over the whole of
Ethiopia as some politicians have presented it. The university at Addis
Ababa became the venue where politically minded teachers and students
from all districts of Tigray converged and discussed issues concerning the
whole of Tigray. Land degradation, recurring famines, massive unemploy-
ment, political marginalization, cultural domination and different aspects
of social problems were some of the issues that arose, and their solutions
were debated by students. They compared the level of the problems with
those in other regions of Ethiopia, believing that conditions in Tigray were
by far the worst. This assessment was often expressed sentimentally, in
relation to the past glory of Tigray and its standing in the history of the
Ethiopian nation.
The pan-Ethiopian student movement was growing in scope from the
second half of the 1960s. Earlier prominent activists of the Tigrayan
students’ movement included Sibhatu Wibneh (killed by Haile Selassie’s
security agents in 1970), Giday Gebrewahid (killed in mid-1975 by the
Derg soon after it came to power), Amare Tesfu (also killed in early 1975
by a group called the Tigray Liberation Force, of which he was a member),
576
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
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Page 9
Tesfay Teklu, Mitiku Asheber, Abebe Tesema, Atsbaha Hailemariam,
Gebrekidan Desta and Rezene Kidane, among others. In the early 1970s
the Tigrayan University Students’ Association (TUSA) was formed. TUSA
pledged to function not only in Addis Ababa but also in Tigray when the
university closed for the vacations. Many Tigrayan university students,
including all the founding members of the TNO, were involved in the
association’s activities during both the academic year and the vacations. As
members of the university community, they were also participating actively
at all levels of the Ethiopian student movement, in many cases taking a
leading role. Meles Tekele — later killed by the Derg — and Abay Tsehaye,
who still survives in the EPRDF leadership today, were TUSA members
who led the editorial branch of the university students’ union. The present
author headed the university’s political science students’ association for a
year (1972–73), and Berhane Eyasu, a leading member in the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), who was to be killed fighting the
Derg, was also a TUSA activist before he joined the EPRP.
In Addis Ababa,TUSA’s function was limited to discussions of a political
nature and to contacting influential people like parliamentarians, business-
men and professional personalities from Tigray to persuade them to con-
tribute something tangible to mitigate the dismal situation in Tigray.
Occasional papers like Etek (‘To Arms!’) and Dimtsi Bihere Tigray (‘Voice
of the Tigrayan Nation’) were produced and distributed free of charge.
Such activities were agitational in nature and broadened the link among
Tigrayans engaged in various walks of life. The contribution of Tigrayan
parliamentarians like Ato Gessesew Ayele (Sihule), Ato AsfawWoldearegay,
Ato Alemseged Gebre Egziabiher, Weyzero Tsehaytu Gebreselasie, Keg-
nazmach Teklit Mekonen, Ato Zenawi Tokola and others, both in terms of
financial input and many aspects of advice,was immense. Intellectuals and
professionals, among them Ato Bekele Berhane, Dr Assefa Abraha, Dr
Itbarek Gebre Egziabiher, Ato Tsegaye Hailu, Ato Hagos Atsbaha, Ato
Kidane Asayehgn, Ato Aynalem Aregehegn, and Dr Tesfay Berhe, gave
initial support to the movement. Such people and many others saw them-
selves as victims of ethnic repression and political persecution. Ato Alem-
seged G. Egziabiher, for instance, had to spend months in poor conditions
in prison under the Haile Selassie regime on account of his progressive
views as a parliamentarian.
TUSA’s major activities, however, were carried out in the eight awrajas
(districts) of Tigray, particularly during the Ethiopian winter when the uni-
versity was closed for vacation. Supplementary education for high school
students, development projects such as reforestation, and political awareness-
raising on fundamental problems and their solutions, were the focus of the
association’s activities. Educational and developmental activities were
carried out with legal permits and the co-operation of the then governor of
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
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Tigray, Ras Mengesha Seyoum, who, on one occasion, when TUSA’s
leading members approached the Ras in Addis Ababa, went so far as to
criticize openly various government ministers, particularly the minister of
education, for standing against his developmental policies in Tigray.
TUSA’s political awareness programme, however, was carried out without
the knowledge of the provincial government authorities, which would cer-
tainly have thwarted every activity of the association if they had known that
they themselves were being blamed for collaborating with the oppressors in
the central government. Ras Mengesha himself was seen as an accomplice
of the ruling group both by marriage and class interest, hence an element
to be removed by the wind of change.
While advancing the associational programme, clandestine groups were
organized to study Marxist dialectics, the class struggle, the national
question and other revolutionary issues of the time. These study groups
used every legally permitted opportunity in their activities to disseminate
their revolutionary ideas with the aim of raising the level of consciousness
of the people as a whole. The dissemination of nationalist revolutionary
ideas was carried out through leaflets, songs and informal discussions,
which were carefully crafted so as not to antagonize the conservative
peasant society of Tigray. No mention of Marxist rhetoric was made outside
the young educated revolutionaries. In those days everyone seemed moti-
vated to exchange revolutionary ideas advocating change. The call for
armed struggle to get rid of the oppressive feudal regime was entertained
more often than it was mentioned.
Within TUSA, a politically conscious group by the name of Mahber
Gesgesti Bihere Tigray (MAGEBT), aimed at creating a higher form of
organization, evolved at the beginning of 1974. Literally translated, the
name means the Association of Progressives from the Tigray Nation, but
for convenience it was called the Tigrayan National Organization (TNO).
The TNO was later to become the mother organization of the TPLF.While
these TNO-led activities were under way, another group called the Political
Association of Tigrayans (PAT), led by Yohannes Teklehaimanot and Gebre
Kidan, was involved underground in a purely political mobilization of
Tigrayans against the Ethiopian regime. This association advocated the
outright independence of Tigray and later emerged as an armed organiz-
ation known as the Tigray Liberation Front (TLF). It was the TNO that
was to evolve into the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and, after
sixteen years of guerrilla war, was to become the government of Ethiopia.
The TNO was established at a meeting held on 14 September 1974,
attended by seven university students: Zeru Gessese (Agazi),
18
Fantahun
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AFRICAN AFFAIRS
18. The names in brackets were given to the respective individual members of the organiz-
ation in the early days of the struggle to disguise their real names for fear of enemy pursuit.
Some of those listed have retained these pseudonyms.
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Zeratsion (Giday), Mulugeta Hagos (Asfeha), Ambay Mesfine (Seyoum),
Alemseged Mengesha (Hailu), Amha Tsehaye (Abay) and the present
author (Berihu). The seven met in an inconspicuous café in Piazza, in the
centre of Addis Ababa. Ato Gessesew Ayele (Sihule), twice a member of
parliament and still a popular representative of Tigrayans at the time,
belonged to this group but could not attend the meeting for security
reasons. All these people had known each other for years, working together
in the struggle against the repression of the Tigrayans in particular and the
Ethiopian peoples in general.
The aim of the 14 September meeting was, first, to reach a common
understanding of the nature and disposition of the Derg’s regime with
respect to the self-determination of Tigray and the future of democracy in
Ethiopia; second, to reflect upon what form of struggle to pursue and how
to tackle the main challenges that would henceforth arise; and third, to
outline how to work and co-ordinate activities with the Ethiopian left which
hitherto had operated according to much broader revolutionary ideals.
These grand ambitions were not new. Those at the meeting had previously
been reflecting on these matters informally. Thus, by the end of the day
they had drafted a two-page general guideline.
19
The guideline declared that:
• The strategy of the movement is the formation of a democratic
Ethiopia in which the equality of all nationalities is respected.
• A national armed struggle should be waged that would advance from
the rural areas of Tigray to the urban areas.
• The movement should be led by an urban-based organization known
as the Tigrayan National Organization until such time as the armed
struggle could begin.
It was unanimously understood that the TNO was a preparatory stage for
the armed struggle. The founders of the TNO collectively assumed many
tasks including undertaking propaganda and political work to prepare for
the ensuing armed struggle, recruiting individuals to be members of the
TNO from which later combatants in the armed struggle could be
recruited, collecting materials and information necessary for the struggle,
and so on. To accomplish these and other broadly defined tasks, the TNO
founders had to organize closely the active elements in the association and
political movements with which they were in contact so far and on which
they would rely for the painstaking fight ahead. It is therefore necessary to
give a short account of the activities in the association and of the political
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
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19. This two-page guideline should be located in the archives of the TPLF as a classified
document. Access to such documents is only possible with the permission of Meles Zenawi,
the current Prime Minister.
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movements from which the TNO sprang and on which it would depend so
heavily in the ensuing sixteen years of armed struggle to bring down the
military government. The TNO had contacts with many radical Tigrayans,
and later it was not difficult to assemble them in the TPLF. The TNO’s
immediate goal was achieved when it transformed itself into an armed
organization, the TPLF, in February 1975.
Political ideologies
The Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s and ’70s was marked by
an unprecedented political radicalism. It was dedicated to struggle against
imperialism and feudalism — systems that were believed to have kept
Ethiopia in the most backward stage of development. Most of the younger
generation who had passed through high school and university were revol-
utionary enthusiasts belonging to this ideological and political wave. Their
dream was to change Ethiopia’s dismal backwardness in a revolutionary
manner. At times they played the role of an opposition political party. The
experiences of the Bolsheviks’ Russia, Maoist China, Ho Chi Minh’s
Vietnam and Che Guevera’s internationalism were espoused as guiding
precedents to redeem Ethiopia from its predicament. The revolutionary
student generation of that time was, as it later proved, ready to make any
sacrifice to undo the grip of imperialism and feudalism in the country.This
revolutionary fervour was part of the international wave of the 1960s.
Marxist revolutionary ideals were thought to be impeccable, the only appro-
priate guiding tenets through which the country was to be transformed from
its backwardness.
Although class-based ideological orientation was prevalent among the
student body, ethno-national mobilization was also a concomitant ideo-
logical stance in the students’ movement. Marx’s stand on the Irish national
question — that it had to be resolved if the British proletariat were to
advance to socialism — was recalled to justify the question of nationalities
in Ethiopia.The theories of Lenin and Stalin on the national question were
also used as tools for combating national oppression in Ethiopia. In
Leninist fashion, revolutionary students referred to Ethiopia as the ‘prison
house of nationalities’.
The ethno-nationalist sentiment in the young educated class was
strengthened by several factors. On the one hand, the monopoly of power
by the dominant Showan-Amhara feudal class, that fostered its ethnic
hegemony and kept Ethiopia in the dark, was the prime cause for ethnic
resistance. On the other hand, the influence of the previous rebellions in
Tigray (the 1942–43 Woyane), in Gojjam (the 1967 revolt), in Bale (the
1963–68 rebellion) and in Eritrea (the 1960s–70s armed struggle) served
as historical precedents to challenge the existing oppressive state of affairs.
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Those who came from marginalized ethnic nationalities wanted to assert
their hitherto neglected identity and equality by all means possible. Revol-
utionary students from the dominant nationality, the Amhara, as well,
vigorously upheld, as a matter of principle, the right of nations to self-
determination. Wallelign Mekonen (an Amhara from Wollo region)
produced an outstanding article on the national question in Ethiopia, in
November 1969 in which he stated that ‘Ethiopia was not a nation, but a
collection of nationalities ruled by the Amharas. To be an Ethiopian, you
will have to wear an Amhara mask.’
20
Moreover, the negative and repres-
sive reaction of the state to such sentiments and the dreadful conditions in
the various localities that were the heartlands of different ethnic groups
were other important factors that solidified ethno-nationalist sentiments
among the various ethnic groups.
Members of the TNO, who either saw no contradiction or ignored any
incompatibility in espousing the class and ethno-national forms of struggle
simultaneously, actively participated in both. It was assumed that the ethno-
nationalist movement, if and when it was guided by a Marxist ideology,was
a sub-set of the class struggle, the former levelling the way for the latter.
For them, the struggle for the creation of a democratic Ethiopia was tan-
tamount to bestowing the right to self-determination on its component
parts, with all the people able to live harmoniously in a fair political and
economic relationship. Those who saw the ethno-national struggle as a
tactic to achieve equality within a united Ethiopia and not as a strategy for
secession were unaware of the turns and zigzags that ethno-nationalist
mobilization could take. They were not able to see that ‘The more politi-
cized ethnicity becomes, the more it dominates other expressions of
identity, eclipsing class, occupational, and ideological solidarities’,
21
and
that ethnic struggles can become ominous. The young revolutionaries
focused only on the positive contribution of ethno-nationalist mobilization
as the most effective and shortest way to uproot the oppressive system.
Their attitude was in conformity with Horowitz,when he wrote that ‘Ethnic
affiliations provide a sense of security in a divided society, as well as a source
of trust, certainty, reciprocal help, and protection against neglect of one’s
interests by strangers’.
22
In this political atmosphere, the progressive Tigrayan students who
formed the TNO also continued to participate actively in the pan-Ethiopian
student movement. They played a role in all the major political activities
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
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581
20. Wallelign Mekonen, quoted in Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation:The history of the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Party (Part 1) (The Red Sea Press, Trenton, NJ, 1993), p. 54.
21. Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1994), p. 15.
22. Donald L. Horowitz, ‘Democracy in divided societies’, in Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner (eds), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, MD and London, 1994), p. 49.
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Page 14
that were to bring about the downfall of Haile Selassie’s monarchy. When
the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), more widely
known as the Derg, took over, they still persisted in forming a pan-
Ethiopian front that could get rid of the military administration and insti-
tute a civilian participatory democratic system. TNO members (later
subsumed into the TPLF) played a major role, among other things, in
exposing the vices and the cynicism behind the Derg’s 1975–6 ‘Campaign
of Development and Co-operation’, a scheme that was intended to disperse
the student body and control or eliminate its radical elements. Later, it was
discovered that eight prominent members of the TNO, because of their
high profile in revolutionary activities, were on the hit list of the Derg’s
security office. The revelation of the existence of this list forced not only
those named but also other radical Tigrayans to go underground or
withdraw from areas of the country controlled by the Derg and find shelter
in rural Tigray or abroad. Some of those who stayed behind in the Derg-
controlled area — revolutionaries like Meles Tekle, Giday Gebrewahid,
Abraha Hagos and many others — were soon killed by the Derg.Those who
left for rural Tigray went not just in search of shelter but also to find ways
and means to launch resistance against the government. It was these
realities that led the TNO to transform itself into the TPLF and engage in
armed insurrection within months of the Derg’s take-over. For TNO
members, it was clear that the intellectual debate that emerged in the early
days of the revolution would soon come to an end with the inevitable estab-
lishment of the military, the best organized section of society. The
TNO/TPLF went so far as to warn those political groups that were hesi-
tating between working with the Derg and standing firm against it to take
the latter position before it was too late.
Tigray on the eve of the insurrection
The population of Tigray in the 1960s was estimated to be nearly two
million.
23
The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia recorded
it as 3.1 million.
24
This census does not include Tigrayans living outside
the region, estimated to be more than one million. More than 75 percent
of the population of Tigray even now speak Tigrigna, a spoken and written
language that had been forbidden by the central government since the
1940s for use in schools, law courts and other official organs. The other
languages spoken in Tigray are Afar, Saho, Agew and Kunama. More than
90 percent of the people at the time the armed struggle began lived in the
582
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
23. Markakis, National and Class Conflict, p. 250.
24. Population and Housing Census Commission, The 1994 Population and Housing Census
of Ethiopia (Government of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 1996), p. 10.
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Page 15
rural areas and worked in agriculture, with a small percentage of pastoralists
living in the lowlands. In the densely populated highlands, because land was
privately owned for generations in a system known as rist in which every
family member could claim a plot, land fragmentation increased the
fragility of agricultural production, forcing the bulk of the peasantry to live
far below subsistence. Still worse, recurring famines (like those of 1972–4),
as a result of drought and locusts, claimed the lives of tens of thousands
of peasants. Government authorities not only neglected the plight of the
people but also continued to levy numerous taxes that it was practically
impossible for the peasants to pay. As a result, thousands of peasants aban-
doned their villages with or without their families. It was common to observe
desperate families seeking shelter in churches and mosques and begging for
food in the streets. Life was often intolerable and desperation reigned.
When the revolution of 1974 uprooted the imperial system, there was a
general desire in Tigray for change.Through songs,writings and other avail-
able means people voiced their readiness to pay any price in the struggle
that could bring them a better future. A series of events like the dramatic
fall of the Emperor, the flight of the hereditary provincial governor of
Tigray, Ras Mengesha Seyoum, and the seizure of power by an unknown
group, was witness to the confusion that reigned during this period of the
early 1970s.
The persistent call of the young educated class — basically students and
teachers — for radical change, with the self-determination of Tigray as a
rallying slogan, inflamed popular aspirations. The imposition of central
control, domination by the Showan-Amhara ruling class, heavy taxation,
and the failure of leaders to improve the wretched life of the people, includ-
ing that of the Showan peasantry whose life was no better than that of the
rest of the peasant population, were sources of complaint in every forum.
It has been said that ‘The most painful cut of all was the banning of the
Tigrai language in a region where, as late as the mid-1970s, only 12.3 per
cent of the males claimed to speak Amharigna and only 7.7 per cent could
read it’.
25
In the rural areas,while farming, and while celebrating religious holidays
or attending a wedding ceremony, men and women alike routinely sang
songs that either evoked the dismal conditions they had to endure or looked
forward to the moment when they could rebel against the repressive system.
In a predominantly peasant and illiterate society like that of Tigray, ideas
are usually communicated orally and are well expressed through songs.Two
of the popular songs that reflected the feelings of anger went as follows:
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
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583
25. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State (Macmillan, Basingstoke and
St Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p. 168.
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Page 16
Tigray kinday maalti kitsebeyeki, (Tigray, how long should I linger?)
Ab balijay geyre kimalaalki (Let me get ‘it’ [the gun] for you)
Gobez Tigray! Gobez Tigray! (Brave of Tigray! Brave of Tigray!)
Zebenka iu tsemede bieray! (Now is your time to mount the ox/weapon)
Students used to write, demonstrate, organize in study groups and sing
songs of a revolutionary nature that were more straightforward and pro-
grammatic. University students took the lead in these revolutionary activi-
ties, confining their Marxist rhetoric to the company of their peers and
expounding the national self-determination of Tigray within the conserva-
tive peasant society. The ethno-nationalist cry was stretched so far as to
invoke the martyred patriots of the 1943 Woyane while hailing their own
movement as the second Woyane. The presence of the elderly Sihule as a
leading figure also helped to popularize the nationalist stance of the
movement and divert attention from the Marxist posture of the students.
Almost every Tigrayan, even the feudal lords and the clergy,who might have
to lose some of their privileges after the revolutionary struggle, seemed to
approve of the call for self-determination, the vision of the educated young
generation, and their efforts to realize it. It was in these circumstances that
the TPLF emerged.
From TNO to TPLF
The core task set by the TNO was to prepare the groundwork for the
armed struggle. All other activities of the TNO revolved around this central
objective. Many university and high school students, teachers and civil
servants were recruited as members of the TNO with the objective of
waging the armed struggle. Although all members understood that the
direction of the TNO was to enter upon an armed movement, only the
younger and more able ones were advised to engage in mental and physical
preparation for the protracted war ahead. They were encouraged to read
about experiences of guerrilla movements in Algeria, China, Cuba, Eritrea,
Guinea-Bissau,Vietnam, and so on.The endurance and revolutionary disci-
pline exhibited in these revolutions were emphasized. The older members,
on the other hand, were advised to keep a low profile and to work under-
ground in towns controlled by the government in order to provide support
for the forthcoming armed struggle. Recruiting and organizing urban
dwellers in cells and supplying them with propaganda materials and other
necessary things like medicine, plus collecting money and stealing relevant
information from the enemy camp,were some of the tasks assigned to them.
Another important task the TNO undertook was establishing a working
relationship with the two existing Eritrean fronts, the EPLF and ELF, for
practical reasons.Although the EPLF claimed to be ‘more progressive’ than
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Page 17
the ELF, and the ELF similarly claimed to be ‘more truly nationalist’ than
the EPLF, the TNO regarded both fronts as nationalist organizations
fighting for the independence of Eritrea. The TNO undertook no research
on this matter, and no formal discussion took place in order to reach this
position on the nature of the fronts and the future of Eritrea. The TNO
adopted this view purely for pragmatic reasons and without serious thought
about its consequences. TNO leaders focused only on the support they
could procure from the Eritrean fronts to facilitate their struggle against the
military regime in Ethiopia.
Because of geographic proximity and language similarity, it was not diffi-
cult for Tigrayans to trace and contact ELF or EPLF fighters. Above all, a
sympathetic attitude on the part of Tigrayans towards the Eritrean fighters
was taking shape in the university,where some Eritrean students were trying
to break the exclusively nationalist stance and forge a people’s movement
all over Ethiopia. When TNO leaders contacted the ELF, the response was
not completely positive.This was because another Tigrayan group, the TLF,
led by Yohannes Tekle Haimanot and Gebre Kidan Asfaha, had already
established a working relationship with the ELF, making the TNO a
somewhat unattractive option to the latter at that time. Perhaps also the
ELF might have considered the TLF as more truly nationalist, since it
upheld the independence of Tigray, similar to the Eritreans’ position. The
response from the EPLF, on the other hand,was prompt and positive. Two
factors might have expedited this reply. First, the EPLF must have been
aware of the fact that its arch-rival the ELF had already established working
relations with a Tigrayan front, the TLF, that could help it expand its area
of operation. Secondly, a group of founders of the EPRP were already in
the field with the EPLF, but their relationship was not going smoothly, since
the former were not able to adopt a clear-cut position on the question of
Eritrean independence.
As communication proceeded for more than five months via letters,
Mehari Tekle (Mussie), an EPLF fighter but a Tigrayan by birth, finally
emerged to facilitate matters. He met with two TNO representatives,
Seyoum and Aregawi, in the outskirts of Asmara in November 1974. Initially,
the TNO leaders thought Mussie was a contact-person representing the
EPLF, but in their first formal meeting with him they discovered that, with
the consent of the EPLF leadership, he was coming to join the TNO and
fight for the self-determination of Tigray. He also disclosed to the TNO
leaders that many other Tigrayans who had been fighting on the side of the
EPLF were eagerly talking about an armed struggle commencing soon in
Tigray and that they were keen to come to their region to fight the enemy.
It had been a common experience for Tigrayans going to Eritrea in search of
work to join the Eritrean fronts to fight the government that was the cause
of their misery. Girmay Jabir, Iyassu Baga, Marta Kahsa, Haile Portsudan
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
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and Kokeb Wodi-Aala were among such fighters. As it emerged later,
Mussie was to be a very important link in many aspects. At a critical time
(the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975) when the ELF and EPLF
were ferociously competing to gain more ground from the demoralized and
retreating Ethiopian government forces, Mussie was the one who main-
tained the link between the EPLF and the TNO. The situation was other-
wise very difficult to handle for inexperienced TNO leaders in a territory
with which they were not familiar.
In the initial discussions with Mussie, the first issue of concern was
military training, since none of the founders of the TNO, except Sihule,
had any military experience whatever. TNO members, most of whom were
university and high school students plus a few teachers,were keen to engage
in training. Mussie informed the TNO that the EPLF was willing to train
as many Tigrayans as the TNO could yield. He also made it clear that the
EPLF leadership would like to see fewer student trainees and more
peasants, the rationale being that the peasants could endure hardship in the
rural circumstances to which they were accustomed.The TNO leaders were
not convinced of this argument, but nevertheless proceeded to recruit
peasant trainees as well.The EPLF’s wish to increase the number of peasant
recruits in the future TPLF army was eventually to have the effect of
neutralizing the educated element in the guerrilla army, which otherwise
would have continued to scrutinize critically and challenge the manner of
leadership at all times, as experienced in the Menkae incident of 1973.
26
It was not difficult to raise recruits for military training. The first group
selected for such training in the EPLF-liberated area arrived in Asmara in
January 1975, a month before the TPLF declared its existence in Tigray.
Among these future tegadelti (fighters) were Abay Tsehay, Hailu Mengesha,
Sahle Abraha (Seye), Atsbaha Dagnew (Shewit),Yohannes Gebre Medhine
(Walta), Tikue Woldu (Awealom) and Legese Zenawi (Meles). The last-
named is the current prime minister of Ethiopia. They had to remain for
some days in hotels in Asmara, as the route to the EPLF field of operation
including Asmara itself had become a war zone, in which it was unsafe to
travel unarmed. During this somewhat chaotic situation, Meles vanished
from the group that was due to move to the field whenever the situation
permitted. Within a few days, however, the situation was calm, and under
the guidance of Mussie, the group, minus Meles, slipped out of Asmara at
night and after two days arrived at the nearest EPLF training camp, Riesi
Adi. There, they started rigorous military training immediately. A month
later Hailu and Abay, on their way with a mission to Tigray, found Meles
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AFRICAN AFFAIRS
26. Menkae refers to an attempt by cadres in the EPLF to democratize the organization,
which the leadership labelled as ‘anarchism’ and crushed by harsh military measures. For
details see Markakis, National and Class Conflict.
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Page 19
75 kilometres from Asmara, in Adi Quala where his mother comes from.
They demanded an explanation for his separation from his comrades in
Asmara. The normally eloquent Meles had nothing plausible to say about
this, and has never given an explanation to this day. The matter was glossed
over in favour of more pressing matters at the beginning of the armed
struggle, but the mystery of his unexplained absence continues to hang over
Meles.
Back in Tigray, the assignment of assembling peasant trainees was
assumed by Sihule and his younger brother Berhane Ayele (Fitewi) in their
home district of Shire. Sihule was to emerge as the single most important
figure in establishing the armed struggle and in the origin of the TPLF, as
we shall shortly see.The two brothers concentrated on recruiting active and
motivated peasants who could cope with the rigorous military training
required. In a matter of three days, some thirty individuals from both
peasant and urban backgrounds, including a few students like Niguse Taye
(Kelebet), were contacted and volunteered to join those who had already
started training in Eritrea.Agazi and Seyoum led this group all the way from
Tigray to Eritrea across enemy-held territory. They joined the first group
and in less than three months had graduated from their training and were
ready for combat.
In the town of Enda-Selassie, Shire, where Sihule was the indispensable
host, the rest of the TNO members were organizing themselves for the
declaration of the beginning of the armed struggle in the countryside of
Tigray. For more than a week, most of the TNO leaders (among them
Sihule, Giday, Asfaha, Seyoum, Agazi, and the present author) had been
discussing and making preparations for when, how and where to start the
long awaited war. On the recommendation of Sihule, it was decided to start
the armed struggle from Dedebit as soon as possible. Other colleagues who
joined this group at this preparatory stage were Asgede (a former soldier in
the Ethiopian army), Kahsay Berhe (Misgina), Michael, Melay and Abraha.
It was believed that the armed struggle should begin before the ultra-
nationalist TLF, the Ethiopian ‘Bolshevik’ EPRP and the monarchist
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), all of which were poised to fight the
Derg from Tigray, could gain ground.
The final preparation for commencing guerrilla warfare was concluded at
Sihule’s home. Sihule made available three rifles, and a fourth came from
Giday who had pilfered it from his father in his absence. Field equipment
and other logistics were either bought or collected from members and sup-
porters and assembled in Sihule’s house. Sihule’s family prepared a few
days’ rations for the contingent that would march to Dedebit. On the last
day before the group’s departure to Dedebit, where the first engagement
was to take place, Sihule’s house looked like the military base of a small
contingent. The future guerrilla fighters were dressed in khaki clothes
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
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suitable for the heat and rough terrain. All wore shorts and the locally made
sandals known as temalatet — most of them for the first time. Everyone was
given a pack of about 20 kg to carry. A mule was bought to help carry extra
provisions. As the family was preparing what was necessary for the field, the
strange scene in their house puzzled all of Sihule’s children, some of whom
were crying because they thought that they were going to lose their father
forever.
At midnight on 18 February 1975 (11 Yekatit 1967 by the Ethiopian
calendar), Fitewi led the way to avoid the police and the government militia.
The group headed for Dedebit, about 80 kilometres from Shire and 900 km
from Addis Ababa — a journey which took two nights. Dedebit became the
starting point and the initial base area of the TPLF. Dedebit saw the begin-
ning of the armed struggle and the birth of the TPLF. The TPLF referred
to its struggle as the Kalai Woyane (‘Second Woyane’), referring to national
self-determination against an oppressive state. From here on, the TPLF
took over the TNO, all of whose activities and members automatically
became part of the TPLF. The time span in which the TNO was formed
and transformed into the TPLF was short, but this swift development at
the time of the Derg has to be seen in the light of the Tigrayan struggle
which had been simmering for decades. Tigrayans in general and the
founders of the TNO/TPLF in particular were more than ever ready at this
revolutionary period to assert their rights in the most effective way.
The military Derg with its radical slogans — mostly borrowed from the
revolutionary university students — might have attracted many Ethiopians
who were seeking change. The TNO/TPLF leaders, however, did not
believe that the spontaneously assembled military officers would live up to
their revolutionary promises. This time, many Tigrayans, including the
founders of the TNO/TPLF, were determined to create a homegrown
organization that could put forward the legitimate interest of the Tigrayans
and find a lasting space in Ethiopian power politics. This was in actual fact
the essence of the struggle for self-determination, for which thousands of
Tigrayans were yearning. Moreover, with its nationalist slogan of ‘Ethiopia
First’, the Derg’s attitude towards ethno-nationalist movements was so dis-
cordant that the TNO/TPLF leaders who saw the rocky path ahead, were
forced to expedite the challenge in its highest form — armed struggle.
The role of Sihule
27
In traditional Tigray, in the rural areas, hardly anyone took the students’
voice seriously at first. When it came to waging an armed struggle, elders
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AFRICAN AFFAIRS
27. Although Sihule is the ‘field name’ given in the armed struggle to Gessesew Ayele, people
liked to call him by this pseudonym as a sign of respect.
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would immediately scorn the students, mocking them with remarks like
‘they must be joking’, or ‘they will go back to their mothers tomorrow’.This
attitude presumably developed from the harsh experiences of vicious wars,
in Ethiopia in general and in Tigray in particular, in which endurance was
tested and scrutinized by others. The key to changing this attitude was
Gessesew Ayele, known as Sihule, who was much older than the young
revolutionary students he joined in the TPLF to wage an armed struggle in
the 1970s.
Sihule was in his late fifties when he left his family and his well-paid
government position as a member of parliament to start the armed struggle
with a few young university students in their twenties. It was not the first
time that he had rebelled against a repressive system: as a boy of 14, he had
resisted the Italian fascist army that occupied Ethiopia from 1935 to 1941,
going with his uncle as far as the southern front to fight the invaders. After
the war, he worked as an Ethiopian representative in British-administered
Eritrea. In 1962, he rebelled against Haile Selassie’s government. At one
point he met Idris Awate, a leader of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),
to discuss the creation of a united front of struggle, although this did not
materialize because of the secessionist stance of the Eritrean movement.
Coming of age in the Ethiopian struggle against the Italian occupation,
Sihule was politically formed in the era of Ethiopia’s struggle for moderniz-
ation and democratic revolution of the 1960s and early ’70s. He was an
ardent Ethiopian who never embraced the secession of Tigray as an option,
unlike some of his young revolutionary comrades. He was a fighter who
always rebelled against higher authorities whenever he observed them
failing to render justice to the ordinary people.
Sihule’s rebellious character in imperial Ethiopia, where absolute loyalty
to the higher authorities was not to be questioned, gained him popularity
not only in his own district of Shire but also in the whole province of Tigray.
Whether or not he held a government post, his house at Enda-Selassie,
Shire,was the venue for peasants with problems who came to seek his advice
and to persuade him to use his influence to find solutions. Sihule held
positions in government on many occasions, but when he found himself at
loggerheads with senior authorities, including Ras Mengesha Seyoum, the
last hereditary governor of Tigray, he more than once went back to his own
locality to pursue his rebellious life. In early 1970, the people of Shire voted
overwhelmingly for him to represent them in the Ethiopian parliament,
where he argued bravely against many odds. Time and again, he spoke not
only for the cause of his own constituency but also for the Ethiopian people
as a whole. After the installation of the Derg, he took up arms against the
military dictators who had toppled Haile Sellasie’s regime, in spite of the
fact that the new rulers had promised to elevate him to higher posts in view
of his background and popularity.
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
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Gessesew Ayele ‘Sihule’ was more than just one of the founders of the
TPLF: he was someone whose background and personality made an
immense contribution to the smooth development of the TPLF, especially
in the initial stages. He was instrumental in organizing the start of the TPLF
military activities, when the armed struggle led by the TPLF against the
Derg began on 18 February 1975. Dedebit, in the remote hills of western
Tigray,was selected as the place to start the armed struggle because Sihule
had prior knowledge of this area and, more importantly, he had the respect
of the people living in the villages adjacent to this terrain. Otherwise, the
people in these villages would definitely have been hostile to the unknown
students whose activities had previously been only in the towns. When rep-
resentatives of the people in Shimelba, Tselimoye and Adi-Mohamedai,
three villages surrounding Dedebit, were approached by the TPLF to
render their support, they did not hesitate. This compliance was granted
not because they understood the objectives of the emerging front, nor
because of the young revolutionary students, but simply because Sihule,
whom they knew very well, was involved. Thus, it was not surprising that,
for some months, the TPLF was referred to not by its proper name, but as
a group that belonged to Gessesew Ayele.
Gessesew Ayele acquired his nickname ‘Sihule’ at the beginning of the
armed struggle in February 1975, in reference to the eighteenth-century
Tigrayan warrior and kingmaker Ras Mikael Sihule, whose power was felt
as far as Gondar and Wollo. Ras Mikael Sihule was known for his decisive
action in getting rid of emperors he thought illegitimate and replacing them
with those of his own choice. He overthrew King Ioas in 1769 and ‘was
responsible for placing the next two Emperors on the throne’.
28
Sihule had
a large extended family and was married to Weyzero Zimam Gebre Hiwet,
who supported him throughout his rebellious life.They had seven children.
Although he was known as a good family man, this did not stop him from
once again engaging in the armed struggle against the new military dicta-
tors that was to cost him his life in 1976. Even his rivals respected him.
Asked about the death of her husband, Weyzero Zimam often says ‘Nebir
bitemot lij tekta’
29
(‘if a leopard dies, she leaves behind her offspring’).
Without the popular Sihule, the unknown TPLF would have found it
difficult to survive and prosper in the district of Shire. The whole area in
the 1970s was infested with shifta. Almost every sub-district of Shire con-
tained two or three renowned shiftas who had under their command groups
ranging from five to thirty in number. Some of the leaders of these shifta
bands were essentially of a criminal type, like Alem Eshet, who considered
590
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
28. Gilkes, The Dying Lion, p. 7.
29. She also said this in an interview with the daily Addis Zemen, Meskerem 9, 1991
(Ethiopian calendar.).
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Page 23
himself in sole command of his domain. The more powerful shiftas had
considerable numbers of automatic rifles.They knew the rugged and rocky
terrain like their own backyard and could manoeuvre effectively.They could
have swept from their territory any unfamiliar group like the TPLF, if it
had not had Sihule. But the reputation of Sihule, and of his younger brother
Berhane Ayele, was sufficient to intimidate every group of shiftas in the
district. At that early stage of the struggle, even fellow peasant fighters used
to treat the student fighters as ‘kids who only know how to play with paper’,
believing that leadership should rest with peasants who knew how to handle
a gun. From the start, Sihule gave the TPLF the legitimacy and popularity
that none of its other members could provide. So it was that an organiz-
ation with its roots in a provincial tradition of armed resistance was able to
equip itself with a sophisticated political ideology and eventually to take
over state power.
Self-determination: a postscript
At the foundation of the TPLF, ‘self-determination’ was understood to
mean autonomy or self-rule for Tigray in a democratic, poly-ethnic Ethiopia.
Later, in the early days of the struggle, self-determination was interpreted
by an ultra-nationalist group within the emerging TPLF to mean secession
from the Ethiopian nation-state, with the aim of establishing an indepen-
dent republic of Tigray, as declared in the TPLF manifesto of 1976. This
standpoint of an independent republic was included in the manifesto by the
group that had been given responsibility for drafting and printing it, which
incidentally happened to be the core of the ultra-nationalist section,
included Abay Tsehay, Sibhat Nega, Seyoum Mesfin and Meles Zenawi,
the current prime minister. The idea of secession, however, was contem-
plated only by a section of the leadership and not by the rank-and-file of
members or by the people of Tigray, who constituted the historic core of
the Ethiopian polity. This extreme position was challenged as soon as it
emerged and was relinquished straightaway, since it had no popular support
but remained for some time a source of subsequent splits in, and defec-
tions from, the organization.
In 1978, the secession option was proclaimed to have been dropped, after
pressure from an internal opposition and from other Ethiopians who saw
no future in secession. Ironically, external pressure, particularly from the
EPLF, also played a significant role in the fight against the secessionists.
Another wedge that was to emerge within the TPLF in the early 1980s
was that caused by the development of an ultra-left ideological brand of
Marxism-Leninism (Stalinism specifically) which culminated in the for-
mation of a group called the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT)
in 1986. Although the MLLT seems nowadays to be out of sight, the
THE ORIGINS OF THE TIGRAY PEOPLE
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591
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ideology it extolled was the source of divisions and defections that by and
large have been racking the organization from within to this day.
The inclusion in the current Ethiopian Constitution of a right to seces-
sion for every nationality (article 39.1), and the adoption of ‘revolutionary
democracy’ as a guiding ideology by the current government, are intrinsi-
cally linked to both the ethno-nationalist and ultra-leftist stances of the
faction led by Meles Zenawi, who governs Ethiopia today.
592
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Daily Dose: The Story of the First Woyane


Daily Dose: The Story of the First Woyane

By Amir Abedellah (forivat@yahoo.com)

Little is known about the first woyane due to lack of research. Perhaps there are few books written about the first woyne. In any case the first woyane of Tigray, Ethiopia laid the foundation for future such as TPLF (Tigray People Libration Front), TLF (Tigray Libration Front), EPLF (Eritrean People Libration Front), ELF (Eritrean Libration Front) etc.
I shall emphasize that this article will discuss in regard to a woyane that existed in the late 1930s or early 1940s led by the great Balabat Hailemariam Reda. The story of woyane begins in the land of Tigray, Ethiopia. It is well written the people of Tigray were always neglected and persecuted under the previous regime that ruled Ethiopia. This is the reason the children of Tigray ran a way from their land for better life. All the rulers made sure that Tigray never prosper and the people were isolated.
When Italy came to colonize Ethiopia the regime of the Despot Haileselasie did not try to stop it, but rather started packing for safe house in London. In the meantime the great people of Ethiopia were attempting to stop the Italy invaders with no avail. The world just looked the other way. Italy did use gas and other prohibited chemicals in order to liquidate the people of Ethiopia. It was condemned by the international world as noted in a resolution.
Italy was defeated by the allied troops and was removed from Ethiopia with great joy. The exiled regime Haileselasie was brought by General Wingate of London to rule Ethiopia. After, five years in exile the Despot Haileselasie back in Ethiopia. Of course many people refused to recognize him as their leader because he did not stay in Ethiopia to fight the Italy like his predessors the Great Atse Yohannes and Atse Tedrows.
As usual Haileselasie started to persecute the people of Tigray. The regime of Hailleselasie went on to exterminate every leader known in Tigray. After, sacking Tigray nobles and leaders the regime went on to do other things. He also increased the tax and levies. His soldiers were hungry for more bribes and corruption was out of control. The regime soldiers were using people houses as their station. Tigray was in total control.
The people of Tigray demanded that the persecution and humiliation against them stop now!!! To no avail. However, the ragtag soldiers of the regime continued to plunder and steal the people property. Out of this situation a group of young men led by Hailemarian Reda began organize. Hence the “group” was called “WOYANE”. Thus, WOYANE was created out from the womb of Tigray to defend the people. Woyane demanded that all activities of the regime such as persecution stop. It is also important to note here for historical accuracy the people of Wigirat and Raya-Azobo were involved in the opposition of the Hailesselasie Regime. Wigirat people always have independent and free from any government. They ruled their stated by their culture. The same can be said with Raya-Azobo.

Anyhow, the woyane were not considered or seen as a major threat by the Despotic-Regime-Haileselasie. So the woyane’s call to stop harassment by the regime was brushed off by the regime.
The First Woyane led by Balabat Hilemariam Reda responded with bombardment and skilled fight against the soldiers of Hailessalsie. The causalities were heavy. And Addis Ababa was shocked.
Again After a couple months the despot Hileselasie came back with his best Generals to defeat the Woyane. This time the Great First Woyane was even better, it destroyed or killed many of its soldiers including famous and trusted Generals of the Despot. At this time the Woyane was able to increase its guns. It also was able to acquire new modernized guns to make its fight more lethal.
The crooked Hilleselassie received a telegram of the soldiers defeat. It recoded that he was greatly ashamed to be defeated by the Tigray. He was amazed and humiliated that the untrained Woyane was able to defeat his disciplined soldiers. Therefore sending more troops would just increase his humiliation. Also, the more he send troops the stronger the woyane are getting due to more cache of arms.
So the regime had to hatch a new plan on how to eliminate the Woyane. His throne was at stake if the woyane was not defeated. The new plan was to call his master (British) for help. As we all remember the British gave him a place to stay while his country was ruled by Italy. Then the British General Wingate brought the regime back to Addis Ababa. Since then Haileselasie has named a University after General Wingate.
Always to do his bidding in any matter the British were called. At his request the British Air Force were asked to bomb Woyane. The Airplane bombed Mekele where the Woyane resided. The woyanes were bombed day and night by the British until it was dismantled and unable to organize. The great Balabat Hilemarim Reda was arrested.
It must be noted that the British Airplane never destroyed the woyane but it did put halt on the movement. The people of Tigray, Ethiopia always new that woyane was never defeated by the British. But it chose jut to disband for the time being for the sake of the people. So the bombardment of airplane which was aimed at the market place can stop.
British colony which was the empire of the world or ruler at that time was bogged down to stop the spread of woyane. However, the people of Tigray using their best weapon the “woyane” were able to shock the Hailleselasie Regime like never before all the way from Mekelle to Addis Ababa. Maybe, it thought that it had put an end to woyane. The regime may not be aware THE SYMPOTOMS OF WOYANE WOULD LATER APPEAR IN THE FORM OF TPLF THAT CAME TO RESCUE ETHIOPIA.

Long Live Ethiopia.

Ethiopian can not afford a prolonged war.

Ethiopian can not afford a prolonged war. Ethiopia as the poorest country in the world is dependent on aid. A prolonged war simply depletes ...